A paper of mine on “double-counting” and novel evidence just came out: ”Some surprising facts about (the problem of) surprising facts” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.10.005
ABSTRACT: A common intuition about evidence is that if data x have been used to construct a hypothesis H, then x should not be used again in support of H. It is no surprise that x fits H, if H was deliberately constructed to accord with x. The question of when and why we should avoid such ‘‘double-counting’’ continues to be debated in philosophy and statistics. It arises as a prohibition against data mining, hunting for significance, tuning on the signal, and ad hoc hypotheses, and as a preference for predesignated hypotheses and ‘‘surprising’’ predictions. I have argued that it is the severity or probativeness of the test—or lack of it—that should determine whether a double-use of data is admissible. I examine a number of surprising ambiguities and unexpected facts that continue to bedevil this debate.