Phil 6334 Syllabus: Fifth Installment

Below is the 4th Installment of Phil 6334 Syllabus, which replaces any previous syllabus.

PHIL 6334 (crn: 15631): Spring 2014

Philosophy of Statistical Inference and Modeling
Thurs 3:30-6:15pm, Major William 225

Syllabus: Fifth Installment  (April 24)


E&I: Mayo & Spanos (eds) (2010). Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, CUP.

EGEK: Mayo (1996.) Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, U of Chicago P.

Spanos (1999). Probability Theory and Statistical Inference: Econometric Modeling with Observational Data, CUP.


Bacchus, Kyburg, & Thalos (1990). Against ConditionalizationSynthese (85): 475-506.

Barnett, V. (1999).  Comparative Statistical Inference, John Wiley & Sons. (Chapter 6)

Begley & Ellis (2012) Raise standards for preclinical cancer research. Nature 483: 531-533.

Berger, (2003). Could Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman have Agreed on Testing?Stat Sci 18: 1-12.

Crupi & Tentori (2010). Irrelevant Conjunction: Statement and Solution of a New Paradox, Phil Sci, 77, 1–13.

Cox & Mayo.  (2010). Objectivity and Conditionality in Frequentist Inference (E&I: 276-304).

Fisher (1955), Statistical Methods and Scientific Induction, J R Stat Soc (B) 17: 69-78.

Fitelson & Hawthorne (2004). Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence, Phil Sci 71: 505–514.

Gelman & Shalizi (2013). “Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics” (with discussion)Brit. J. Math. Stat. Psy. 66(1): 5-64.

Howson (1997).  A Logic of InductionPhil Sci 64(2): 268-290.

Mayo (1997). Response to Howson and LaudanPhil Sci 64(2): 323-333.

Howson & Urbach (1993). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 2nd ed.  Open court. (Chapter 15)

Howson & Urbach (2006). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 3nd ed. Open court. (Chapter 5)

Ioannidis (2005).  Why most published research findings are false. PLoS Med 2(8): e124.

Mayo (2003). “Commentary on J. Berger’s Fisher Address,” Stat Sci 18: 19-24.

Mayo (2005). Philosophy of Statistics in Sarkar & Pfeifer (eds.) Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Routledge: 802-815.

Mayo (2013). Comments on A. Gelman and C. ShaliziBrit. J. Math. Stat. Psy. 66(1): 5-64.

Mayo & Cox (2010). Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference (E&I: 247-275).

Mayo & Spanos (2004). “Methodology in Practice: Statistical Misspecification Testing,” Phil Sci 71: 1007-1025.

Mayo & Spanos (2006). Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of InductionBrit. J. Phil. Sci., 57: 323-357.

Mayo & Spanos (2011). Error Statistics in Philosophy of Statistics , Handbook of Philosophy of Science 7, Philosophy of Statistics, (Gabbay, Thagard & Woods (eds); Bandyopadhyay & Forster (Vol eds.)) Elsevier: 1-46.

Meehl, P. (1978). Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 46: 806-834.

Neyman (1956). Note on an Article by Sir Ronald Fisher, J R Stat Soc (B) 18: 288-294.

Pearson (1955). Statistical Concepts in Their Relation to Reality, J R Stat Soc (B) 17: 204-207.

Peng, R. D., Dominici, F. & Zeger, S. L. (2006).  “Reproducible Epidemiologic Research” American Journal of Epidemiology 163 (9), 783-789.

Popper (1962). Conjectures and RefutationsThe Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Basic Books.

Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn (2011). False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allow Presenting Anything as Significant, Psych. Sci., 22(11): 1359-1366 (SSRN)

Spanos (2010). Exchanges with David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo (E&I: 315-330).

Young, S. & Karr, A. (2011). Deming, Data and Observational Studies. Signif. 8 (3), 116–120.

Optional Readings:

Achinstein (2010). Mill’s Sins or Mayo’s Errors?  (E&I: 170-188).

Mayo (2004). An Error-Statistical Philosophy of Evidence in The Nature of Scientific Evidence: Statistical, Philosophical & Empirical Considerations. (Taper & Lele eds.), UCP: 79-118.

Mayo (2010). An Error in the Argument from Conditionality and Sufficiency to the Likelihood Principle (E&I: 305-14).

Mayo (2010). Sins of the Epistemic Probabilist: Exchanges with Achinstein (E&I: 189-201).

Mayo (forthcoming). On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle, (with discussion) Stat. Sci.

Senn (2011). You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably WrongRMM 2.

Skyrms (1975). Choice & Chance, 2nd ed., Dickenson Pub. Co. [Chap V Probability & Carnap pp. 206-211.]

Spanos (2013). Who Should Be Afraid of the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox? Phi Sci 80 (1):73-93.

RMM COLLECTION (2011-2012): Rationality, Markets and Morals: Studies at the Intersection of Philosophy and Economics(Albert, Kliemt, Lahno, eds). Special Topic: Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do (Should) They Meet in 2011 and Beyond? (Mayo, Spanos & Staley Guest eds.).

The Cartoon Guide to Statistics (1993)  Larry Gonick  & Woollcott Smith, HarperPerennial.

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