While I would agree that there are differences between Bayesian statisticians and Bayesian philosophers, those differences don’t line up with the ones drawn by Jon Williamson in his presentation to our Phil Stat Wars Forum (May 20 slides). I hope Bayesians (statisticians, or more generally, practitioners, and philosophers) will weigh in on this.Continue reading
Monthly Archives: May 2021
After Jon Williamson’s talk, Objective Bayesianism from a Philosophical Perspective, at the PhilStat forum on May 22, I raised some general “casualties” encountered by objective, non-subjective or default Bayesian accounts, not necessarily Williamson’s. I am pasting those remarks below, followed by some additional remarks and the video of his responses to my main kvetches. Continue reading
The ninth meeting of our Phil Stat Forum*:
The Statistics Wars
and Their Casualties
20 May 2021
TIME: 15:00-16:45 (London); 10:00-11:45 (New York, EST)
For information about the Phil Stat Wars forum and how to join, click on this link.
“Objective Bayesianism from a philosophical perspective”
Jon Williamson Continue reading
Tom Sterkenburg Reviews Mayo’s “Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars” (2018, CUP)
Tom Sterkenburg, PhD
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
Deborah G. Mayo: Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars
The foundations of statistics is not a land of peace and quiet. “Tribal warfare” is perhaps putting it too strong, but it is the case that for decades now various camps and subcamps have been exchanging heated arguments about the right statistical methodology. That these skirmishes are not just an academic exercise is clear from the widespread use of statistical methods, and contemporary challenges that cry for more secure foundations: the rise of big data, the replication crisis.