Oxford Jail is an entirely fitting place to be on Halloween!

Moreover, rooting around this rather lavish set of jail cells (what used to be a single cell is now a dressing room) is every bit as conducive to philosophical reflection as is exile on Elba! My goal (while in this gaol—as the English sometimes spell it) is to try and free us from the bogeymen and bogeywomen often associated with “classical” statistics. As a start, the very term “classical statistics” should I think be shelved, not that names should matter.

In appraising statistical accounts at the foundational level, we need to realize the extent to which accounts are viewed through the eyeholes of a mask or philosophical theory. Moreover, the mask some wear while pursuing this task might well be at odds with their ordinary way of looking at evidence, inference, and learning. In any event, to avoid non-question-begging criticisms, the standpoint from which the appraisal is launched must itself be independently defended. But for Bayesian critics of error statistics the assumption that uncertain inference demands a posterior probability for claims inferred is thought to be so obvious as not to require support. Critics are implicitly making assumptions that are at odds with the frequentist statistical philosophy. In particular, they assume a certain philosophy about statistical inference (probabilism), often coupled with the allegation that error statistical methods can only achieve radical behavioristic goals, wherein all that matters are long-run error rates (of some sort)

Criticisms then follow readily: the form of one or both:

- Error probabilities do not supply posterior probabilities in hypotheses, interpreted as if they do (and some say we just can’t help it), they lead to inconsistencies
- Methods with good long-run error rates can give rise to counterintuitive inferences in particular cases.
- I have proposed an alternative philosophy that replaces these tenets with different ones:
- the role of probability in inference is to quantify how reliably or severely claims (or discrepancies from claims) have been tested
- the severity goal directs us to the relevant error probabilities, avoiding the oft-repeated statistical fallacies due to tests that are overly sensitive, as well as those insufficiently sensitive to particular errors.
- Control of long run error probabilities, while necessary is not sufficient for good tests or warranted inferences.

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