Mayo Pubs


Mayo CV: (pdf)

Books:

Philosophy of Statistics:

  • Mayo, D. G. (2020). Rejecting Statistical Significance Tests: Defanging the Arguments. In JSM Proceedings, Statistical Consulting Section. Alexandria, VA: American Statistical Association. xx-xx.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2020). “Significance Tests: Vitiated or Vindicated by the Replication Crisis in Psychology?” Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2020). “P-Values on Trial: Selective Reporting of (Best Practice Guides Against) Selective Reporting” Harvard Data Science Review 2.1.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2019). “P-value Thresholds: Forfeit at Your Peril,” European Journal of Clinical Investigation 49(10). EJCI-2019-0447
  • Mayo, D. G. (2018).”Experimental Flukes and Statistical Modeling in the Higgs Discovery,” in Isabelle Peschard and Bas van Fraassen (Eds.), The Experimental Side of Modeling in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota Press, 189-217.
  • Lakens, D., et al (mega-team of 85 authors) (2018). “Justify Your Alpha,” Nature Human Behavior 2, 168-171.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2016). “Don’t Throw out the Error Control Baby with the Bad Statistics Bathwater: A Commentary” on R. Wasserstein and N. Lazar: “The ASA’s Statement on P-values: Context, Process, and Purpose”, The American Statistician 70(2).
  • Spanos, A. and Mayo, D. G.  (2015). “Error Statistical Modeling and Inference: Where Methodology Meets Ontology”. Synthese, 192(11),  3533-3555.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2014). “On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle,” (with discussion) Statistical Science 29(2) pp. 227-239, 261-266.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2013). “Presented Version: On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle.” In JSM Proceedings, Section on Bayesian Statistical Science. Alexandria, VA: American Statistical Association, 440-453.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2012). “Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations”, Rationality, Markets, and Morals (RMM) 3, Special Topic: Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science, 71–107.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2011) “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and beyond).” Rationality, Markets and Morals (RMM) 2, Special Topic: Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science, 79–102.
  • Cox, D. R. and Mayo, D. G. (2011) “A Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation between Sir David Cox and Deborah Mayo (as recorded, June 2011).”  Rationality, Markets and Morals (RMM), 2, Special Topic: Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science, 103-114.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Spanos, A. (2011) “Error Statistics” in Philosophy of Statistics , Handbook of Philosophy of Science Volume 7 Philosophy of Statistics, (General editors: Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard and John Woods; Volume eds. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm R. Forster.) Elsevier: 1-46.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2010). “An Error in the Argument from Conditionality and Sufficiency to the Likelihood Principle” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 305-14.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Cox, D. R. (2010). “Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-27. This paper appeared in The Second Erich L. Lehmann Symposium: Optimality, 2006, Lecture Notes-Monograph Series, Volume 49, Institute of Mathematical Statistics, pp. 247-275.
  • Cox D. R. and Mayo. D. G. (2010). “Objectivity and Conditionality in Frequentist Inference” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 276-304.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Spanos, A. (2010). “Introduction and Background: Part I: Central Goals, Themes, and Questions; Part II The Error-Statistical Philosophy” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-14, 15-27.
  • Mayo, D.G. and Cox, D. R. (2006) “Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference,” Optimality: The Second Erich L. Lehmann Symposium (ed. J. Rojo), Lecture Notes-Monograph series, Institute of Mathematical Statistics (IMS), Vol. 49: 77-97.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Spanos, A. (2006). “Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Induction,” British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 57: 323-357.
  • Mayo, D. (2006). “Philosophy of Statistics” in S. Sarkar and J. Pfeifer (eds.) Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, London: Routledge: 802-815.
  • Mayo, D. and Spanos, A (2004). “Methodology in Practice: Statistical Misspecification Testing,” Philosophy of Science 71: 1007-1025.
  • Mayo, D. (2004). “An Error-Statistical Philosophy of Evidence,” in M. Taper and S. Lele (eds.) The Nature of Scientific Evidence: Statistical, Philosophical and Empirical Considerations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 79-118.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Kruse, M. (2001). “Principles of Inference and Their Consequences,” in D. Cornfield and J. Williamson (eds.) Foundations of Bayesianism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishes: 381-403.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Spanos, A. (2000) “A Post-data Interpretation of Neyman-Pearson Methods Based on a Conception of Severe Testing.” Measurements in Physics and Economics Discussion Paper Series, History and Methodology of Economics group. The London School of Economics and Political Science. London: Tymes Court.
  • Mayo, D. (1992). “Did Pearson Reject the Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Statistics?” Synthese 90: 234-262.
  • Mayo, D.. (1985). “Behavioristic, Evidentialist, and Learning Models of Statistical Testing,” Philosophy of Science, 52(4):493-516.
  • Mayo, D. (1983). “An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing.” Synthese 57(2): 297-340.
  • Mayo, D. (1982). “On After-Trial Criticisms of Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers: 145-158.
  • Mayo, D. (1981). “The Foundations of Statistics as a Tool for Technology Studies,” Nature and System 3: 109-114.
  • Mayo, D. (1981). “In Defense of the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Confidence Intervals,” Philosophy of Science, 48(2): 269-280.
  • Mayo, D. (1980). “Testing Statistical Testing,” in J. Pitt (ed.) Philosophy of Economics. Dordrecht: reidel: 175-203.
  • Mayo, D. (1980). “The Philosophical Relevance of Statistics,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers: 97-109

Commentaries (Philosophy of Statistics):

  • Mayo, D. G. (2013): Discussion: Bayesian Methods: Applied? Yes. Philosophical Defense? In Flux, The American Statistician67(1): 11-15. (Commentary on A. Gelman and C. Robert “Not only defended but also applied”: The perceived absurdity of Bayesian inference” (with discussion)
  • Mayo, D. G. (2013) “The Error-statistical Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics: Comments on Gelman and Shalizi: “Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics”, commentary on A. Gelman and C. Shalizi “Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics” (with discussion), Britsh Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 66(1): 57-64.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2003). “Could Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman have Agreed on Testing? Commentary on J. Berger’s Fisher Address,” Statistical Science 18: 19-24.
  • Mayo, D. G. (1998). “Commentary: Some Problems With Chow’s Problems With Power,” (Discussion of Siu Chow’s  Statistical SignificanceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21: 212-213.

General Philosophy of Science:

  • Mayo, D. (forthcoming). “Bad Science as Bad Inquiry: Revisiting Popper’s Demarcation in Light of the Replication Crisis”. In Z. Parusniková and J. Agassi eds.,  Karl Popper: His Science and His Philosophy.  Switzerland: Springer Nature.
  • Mayo, D. (2018). “Experimental Flukes and Statistical Modeling in the Higgs Discovery,” in Isabelle Peschard and Bas van Fraassen (eds.), The Experimental Side of Modeling in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota Press, 189-217.
  • Mayo, D. (2014). “Some surprising facts about (the problem of) surprising facts,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 45 (1), 79-86(Special Section: Novel Predications, Ioannis Votsis, Ludwig Fahrbach, and Gerhard Schurz (eds.)).
  • Mayo, D. (2014).“Learning from Error: How Experiment Gets a Life (Of Its Own)”. In Error and Uncertainty in Scientific Practice. Edited by M. Boumans, G. Hon & A. C. Petersen. London: Pickering and Chatto, 57-77.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Learning from Error: The Theoretical Significance of Experimental Knowledge,” The Modern Schoolman. Guest editor, Kent Staley. Volume 87, Issue 3/4, March/May 2010 Experimental and Theoretical Knowledge, The Ninth Henle Conference in the History of Philosophy, 191-217.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Error, Severe Testing, and the Growth of Theoretical Knowledge” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science(D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 28-57.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Can Scientific Theories be Warranted with Severity? Exchanges with Alan Chalmers” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 73-87.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Towards Progressive Critical Rationalism: Exchanges with Alan Musgrave” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 115-124.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “An Ad Hoc Save of a Theory of Adhocness? Exchanges with John Worrall” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:155-169.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Sins of the Epistemic Probabilist: Exchanges with Peter Achinstein” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 189-201.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Explanation and Testing: Exchanges with Clark Glymour” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 351-363.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Error and the Law: Exchanges with Larry Laudan” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 397-409.
  • Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2010). “Introduction and Background: Part I: Central Goals, Themes, and Questions; Part II The Error-Statistical Philosophy” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-14, 15-27.
  • Mayo, D. and Miller, J. (2008). “The Error Statistical Philosopher as Normative Naturalist” Synthese 163(3): 305.
  • Mayo, D. (2008). “How to Discount Double-Counting When It Counts: Some Clarifications,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59: 857–879.
  • Mayo, D. (2006). “Critical Rationalism and Its Failure to Withstand Critical Scrutiny,” in C. Cheyne and J. Worrall (eds.) Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, Kluwer Series Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Springer: The Netherlands: 63-99.
  • Mayo, D. (2005). “Evidence as Passing Severe Tests: Highly Probable versus Highly Probed Hypotheses” in P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 95-127.
  • Mayo, D. (2005). “Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis,” in R. Mayorga (guest ed.) Peirce-spectives on Metaphysics and the Sciences, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: 299-319.
  • Mayo, D. (2003). “Severe Testing as a Guide for Inductive Learning,” in H. Kyburg (ed.), Probability Is the Very Guide in Life. Chicago: Open Court: 89-117.
  • Mayo, D. (2002). “Novel Work on Problems of Novelty? Comments on Hudson.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34: 131-134.
  • Mayo, D. (2002). “Theory Testing, Statistical Methodology, and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge,” in P. Gardenfors, J. Wolenski, and K. Kijania-Placek (eds.) “In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, (Volume 1 of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Cracow August,1999). Dordrecht: Kluwer: 171-190.
  • Mayo, D. (2000) “Experimental Practice and and Error Statistical Account of Evidence,” in D. Howard (ed.), Symposia ProceedingsPhilosophy of Science 67: S193-S207.
  • Mayo, D. (2000). “Models of Error and the Limits of Experimental Testing” in M. Carrie (ed.) Science at Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 317-344.
  • Mayo, D (2000). “Science, Error Statistics, and Arguing From Error” in N. Shanks and R. Gardner (eds.) Pozen Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 71, Amsterdam: Rudopi: 95-111.
  • Mayo, D (2000). “What is This Thing Called Philosophy of Science?” Review Symposium of A. Chalmers’ What is This Thing Called Science?, Metascience 9: 179-188.
  • Mayo, D. (1999). “Making Progress with Laudan’s Problems: 1977-1997,” in Progress and Its Problems After 20 Years. The National Autonomous University of Mexico (in Spanish).
  • Mayo, D. (1997). “Duhem’s Problem, The Bayesian Way, and Error Statistics, or ‘What’s Belief got To Do With It?'” and “Response to Howson and Laudan,” Philosop2hy of Science 64(1): 222-244 and 323-333.
  • Mayo, D. (1997) “Error Statistics and Learning from Error: Making a Virtue of Necessity,” in L. Darden (ed.) Supplemental Issue PSA 1996: Symposia Papers, Philosophy of Science 64: S195-S212.
  • Mayo, D. (1997). “Severe Tests, Arguing From Error, and Methodological Underdetermination,” Philosophical Studies86 (3).
  • Mayo, D. (1996). “Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasting the Kuhn’s-Eye View of Popper’s Demarcation of Science,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47: 271-290.
  • Mayo, D. (1994). “The New Experimentalism, Topical Hypotheses, and Learning From Error” in D. Hull, M. Forbes, & R.M. Burian, Proceedings of the 1994 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.
  • Mayo, D. (1993). “The Test of Experiment: C. S. Peirce and E. S. Pearson,” in E. Moore, ed., Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science, Tuscaloose: University of Alabama Press.
  • Mayo, D. (1991). “Novel Evidence and Severe Tests,” Philosophy of Science58 (4): 523-552. Reprinted (1991) in The Philosopher’s Annual XIV: 203-232.
  • Mayo, D. (1988). “Brownian Motion and the Appraisal of Theories,” in L. Laudan, R. Laudan, and A. Donovan Scrutinizing Science.. Dordrecht: Reidel: 219-243.
  • Mayo, D. (1987). “How Everyone Can Have a Rare Property: Response to Sober on Frequency-Dependent Causation.” Philosophy of Science 54: 266-276.
  • Mayo, D. (1986).  “Cartwright, Causality, and Coincidence,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers: 42-58
  • Mayo, D. (1986). “Understanding Frequency-Dependent Causation,” Philosophical Studies 49: 109-124.

Philosophy of Specific Sciences, Risk & Policy:

  • Mayo, D. (2008). “Some Methodological Issues in Experimental Economics,” Philosophy of Science, 75: 633-645.
  • Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2008). “Risks to Health and Risks to Science: The Need for a Responsible ‘Bioevidential Scrutiny,'” Biological effects of low Level Exposures, Newsletter 14(3): 18-22.
  • Mayo, D. & Spanos, A. (2008). “Risks to health and risks to science: the need for a responsible “bioevidential” scrutiny”, Human & Experimental Toxicology 27: 621–625.
  • Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2006).”Philosophical Scrutiny of Evidence of Risks: From Bioethics to Bioevidence, Philosophy of Science 73(5): 803-17.
  • Mayo, D. (1991). “Sociological vs Metascientific Views of Risk Assessment” in D. Mayo and R. Hollander (eds.) Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management,  New York: Oxford University Press: 249-279. Reprinted (with modifications) as “Sociological versus Metascientific Views of Technological Risk Assessment” in K. Shrader-Frechette and L. Westra (eds.) Technology and Values Rowman & Littlefield (1997).
  • Mayo, D. (1988). “Toward a More Objective Understanding of the Evidence of Carcinogenic Risk,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers: 489-503.
  • Mayo, D. and N. Gilinsky (1987). ” Models of Group Selection,” Philosophy of Science, 54(4): 515-538.
  • Mayo, D. (1986). Understanding Frequency-Dependent Causation” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 49: 109-124.
  • Mayo, D. (1985). “Increasing Public Participation in Controversies Involving Hazards: The Values of Metastatistical Rules,”Science, Technology, and Human Values 10(4): 55-68.
  • Mayo, D. (1983). “Against a Scientific Justification of Animal Experiments,” in H. B. Miller & W. H. Williams Ethics and Animals, Clifton: New Jersey: Humana Press: 339-359.

Commentaries (Philosophy of Special Sciences, Risk & Policy):

  • Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2004). “Commentary: When Can Risk-Factor Epidemiology Provide Reliable Tests?”  Epidemology 15: 527-528.

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