Mayo Publications


Books:

                 Preface

                 Chapter 1 Learning from Error

                 Chapter 2 Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasating the Kuhn’s-Eye View of Popper

                 Chapter 3 The New Experimentalism and the Bayesian Way

                 Chapter 4 Duhem, Kuhn, and Bayes

                 Chapter 5 Models of Experimental Inquiry

                 Chapter 6 Severe Tests and Methodological Underdeterminism

                 Chapter 7 The Experimental Basis from Which to Test Hypotheses: Brownian Motion

                 Chapter 8 Severe Tests and Novel Evidence

                 Chapter 9 Hunting and Snooping: Understanding the Neyman-Pearson Predesignationiest Stance

                 Chapter 10 Why You Cannot Be Just a Little Bayesian

                 Chapter 11 Why Pearson Rejected the Neyman-Pearson (Behavioristic) Philosophy and a Note on Objectivity in Statistics

                 Chapter 12 Error Statistics and Peircean Error Correction

                 Chapter 13 Towards and Error-Statistical Phlosophy of Science

                 References

Philosophy of Statistics:

  • Mayo, D. G. and Spanos, A. (2011) “Error Statistics” in Philosophy of Statistics , Handbook of Philosophy of Science Volume 7 Philosophy of Statistics, (General editors: Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard and John Woods; Volume eds. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm R. Forster.) Elsevier: 1-46.
  • Mayo, D. G. (2010). “An Error in the Argument from Conditionality and Sufficiency to the Likelihood Principle” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 305-14.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Cox, D. R. (2010). “Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-27. This paper appeared in The Second Erich L. Lehmann Symposium: Optimality, 2006, Lecture Notes-Monograph Series, Volume 49, Institute of Mathematical Statistics, pp. 247-275.
  • Cox D. R. and Mayo. D. G. (2010). “Objectivity and Conditionality in Frequentist Inference” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 276-304.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Spanos, A. (2010). “Introduction and Background: Part I: Central Goals, Themes, and Questions; Part II The Error-Statistical Philosophy” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-14, 15-27.
  • Mayo, D.G. and Cox, D. R. (2006) “Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference,” Optimality: The Second Erich L. Lehmann Symposium (ed. J. Rojo), Lecture Notes-Monograph series, Institute of Mathematical Statistics (IMS), Vol. 49: 77-97.
  • Mayo, D. (2005). “Philosophy of Statistics” in S. Sarkar and J. Pfeifer (eds.) Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, London: Routledge: 802-815.
  • Mayo, D. (2004). “An Error-Statistical Philosophy of Evidence,” in M. Taper and S. Lele (eds.) The Nature of Scientific Evidence: Statistical, Philosophical and Empirical Considerations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 79-118.
  • Mayo, D. G. and Spanos, A. (2000) “A Post-data Interpretation of Neyman-Pearson Methods Based on a Conception of Severe testing.” Measurements in Physics and Economics Discussion Paper Series, History and Methodology of Economics group. The London School of Economics and Political Science. London: Tymes Court.
  • Mayo, D. (1981). “The Foundations of Statistics as a Tool for Technology Studies,” Nature and System 3: 109-114.
  • Mayo, D. (1980). “Testing Statistical Testing,” in J. Pitt (ed.) Philosophy of Economics. Dordrecht: reidel: 175-203.

Commentaries (Philosophy of Statistics):

General Philosophy of Science:

  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Explanation and Testing: Exchanges with Clark Glymour” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 351-363.
  • Mayo, D. (2010). “Error and the Law: Exchanges with Larry Laudan” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 397-409.
  • Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2010). “Introduction and Background: Part I: Central Goals, Themes, and Questions; Part II The Error-Statistical Philosophy” in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-14, 15-27.
  • Mayo, D. (2002). “Theory Testing, Statistical Methodology, and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge,” in P. Gardenfors, J. Wolenski, and K. Kijania-Placek (eds.) “In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, (Volume 1 of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Cracow August,1999). Dordrecht: Kluwer: 171-190.
  • Mayo, D. (2000). “Models of Error and the Limits of Experimental Testing” in M. Carrie (ed.) Science at Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 317-344.
  • Mayo, D (2000). “Science, Error Statistics, and Arguing From Error” in N. Shanks and R. Gardner (eds.) Pozen Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 71, Amsterdam: Rudopi: 95-111.
  • Mayo, D. (1999). “Making Progress with Laudan’s Problems: 1977-1997,” in Progress and Its Problems After 20 Years. The National Autonomous University of Mexico (in Spanish).
  • Mayo, D. (1991). “Novel Evidence and Severe Tests,” Philosophy of Science58 (4): 523-552. Reprinted (1991) in The Philosopher’s Annual XIV: 203-232.

Philosophy of Specific Sciences, Risk & Policy:

  • Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2008). “Risks to Health and Risks to Science: The Need for a Responsible ‘Bioevidential Scrutiny,'” Biological effects of low Level Exposures, Newsletter 14(3): 18-22.
  • Mayo, D. (1983). “Against a Scientific Justification of Animal Experiments,” in H. B. Miller & W. H. Williams Ethics and Animals, Clifton: New Jersey: Humana Press: 339-359.

Commentaries (Philosophy of Special Sciences, Risk & Policy):

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