Jon Williamson
I am posting Jon Williamson’s* (Philosophy, Kent) U-Phil from 4-15-12
In this paper http://www.springerlink.com/content/q175036678w17478 (Synthese 178:67–85) I identify four ways in which Bayesian conditionalisation can fail. Of course not all Bayesians advocate conditionalisation as a universal rule, and I argue that objective Bayesianism as based on the maximum entropy principle should be preferred to subjective Bayesianism as based on conditionalisation, where the two disagree.
Conditionalisation is just one possible way of updating probabilities and I think it’s interesting to see how different formal approaches compare.
*Williamson participated in our June 2010 “Phil-Stat Meets Phil Sci” conference at the LSE, and we jointly ran a conference at Kent in June 2009.
Error Statistics Philosophy 