Posts Tagged With: behavioristic vs evidential

Neyman April 16, 1894 – August 5, 1981

I’ll continue to post Neyman-related items this week in honor of his birthday. This isn’t the only paper in which Neyman makes it clear he denies a distinction between a test of  statistical hypotheses and significance tests. He and E. Pearson also discredit the myth that the former is only allowed to report pre-data, fixed error probabilities, and are justified only by dint of long-run error control. Controlling the “frequency of misdirected activities” in the midst of finding something out, or solving a problem of inquiry, on the other hand, are epistemological goals. What do you think?

“Tests of Statistical Hypotheses and Their Use in Studies of Natural Phenomena”
by Jerzy Neyman

ABSTRACT. Contrary to ideas suggested by the title of the conference at which the present paper was presented, the author is not aware of a conceptual difference between a “test of a statistical hypothesis” and a “test of significance” and uses these terms interchangeably. A study of any serious substantive problem involves a sequence of incidents at which one is forced to pause and consider what to do next. In an effort to reduce the frequency of misdirected activities one uses statistical tests. The procedure is illustrated on two examples: (i) Le Cam’s (and associates’) study of immunotherapy of cancer and (ii) a socio-economic experiment relating to low-income homeownership problems.

I recommend, especially, the example on home ownership. Here are two snippets: Continue reading →

April 16, 1894 – August 5, 1981

I’ll continue to post Neyman-related items this week in honor of his birthday. This isn’t the only paper in which Neyman makes it clear he denies a distinction between a test of  statistical hypotheses and significance tests. He and E. Pearson also discredit the myth that the former is only allowed to report pre-data, fixed error probabilities, and are justified only by dint of long-run error control. Controlling the “frequency of misdirected activities” in the midst of finding something out, or solving a problem of inquiry, on the other hand, are epistemological goals. What do you think?

“Tests of Statistical Hypotheses and Their Use in Studies of Natural Phenomena”
by Jerzy Neyman

ABSTRACT. Contrary to ideas suggested by the title of the conference at which the present paper was presented, the author is not aware of a conceptual difference between a “test of a statistical hypothesis” and a “test of significance” and uses these terms interchangeably. A study of any serious substantive problem involves a sequence of incidents at which one is forced to pause and consider what to do next. In an effort to reduce the frequency of misdirected activities one uses statistical tests. The procedure is illustrated on two examples: (i) Le Cam’s (and associates’) study of immunotherapy of cancer and (ii) a socio-economic experiment relating to low-income homeownership problems.

I recommend, especially, the example on home ownership. Here are two snippets: Continue reading →

April 16, 1894 – August 5, 1981

“Tests of Statistical Hypotheses and Their Use in Studies of Natural Phenomena” by Jerzy Neyman

ABSTRACT. Contrary to ideas suggested by the title of the conference at which the present paper was presented, the author is not aware of a conceptual difference between a “test of a statistical hypothesis” and a “test of significance” and uses these terms interchangeably. A study of any serious substantive problem involves a sequence of incidents at which one is forced to pause and consider what to do next. In an effort to reduce the frequency of misdirected activities one uses statistical tests. The procedure is illustrated on two examples: (i) Le Cam’s (and associates’) study of immunotherapy of cancer and (ii) a socio-economic experiment relating to low-income homeownership problems.

Neyman died on August 5, 1981. Here’s an unusual paper of his, “Tests of Statistical Hypotheses and Their Use in Studies of Natural Phenomena.” I have been reading a fair amount by Neyman this summer in writing about the origins of his philosophy, and have found further corroboration of the position that the behavioristic view attributed to him, while not entirely without substance*, is largely a fable that has been steadily built up and accepted as gospel. This has justified ignoring Neyman-Pearson statistics (as resting solely on long-run performance and irrelevant to scientific inference) and turning to crude variations of significance tests, that Fisher wouldn’t have countenanced for a moment (so-called NHSTs), lacking alternatives, incapable of learning from negative results, and permitting all sorts of P-value abuses–notably going from a small p-value to claiming evidence for a substantive research hypothesis. The upshot is to reject all of frequentist statistics, even though P-values are a teeny tiny part. *This represents a change in my perception of Neyman’s philosophy since EGEK (Mayo 1996).  I still say that that for our uses of method, it doesn’t matter what anybody thought, that “it’s the methods, stupid!” Anyway, I recommend, in this very short paper, the general comments and the example on home ownership. Here are two snippets: Continue reading →

Neyman, drawn by ?

“Tests of Statistical Hypotheses and Their Use in Studies of Natural Phenomena” by Jerzy Neyman

ABSTRACT. Contrary to ideas suggested by the title of the conference at which the present paper was presented, the author is not aware of a conceptual difference between a “test of a statistical hypothesis” and a “test of significance” and uses these terms interchangeably. A study of any serious substantive problem involves a sequence of incidents at which one is forced to pause and consider what to do next. In an effort to reduce the frequency of misdirected activities one uses statistical tests. The procedure is illustrated on two examples: (i) Le Cam’s (and associates’) study of immunotherapy of cancer and (ii) a socio-economic experiment relating to low-income homeownership problems.

I hadn’t posted this paper of Neyman’s before, so here’s something for your weekend reading:  “Tests of Statistical Hypotheses and Their Use in Studies of Natural Phenomena.”  I recommend, especially, the example on home ownership. Here are two snippets:

1. INTRODUCTION

The title of the present session involves an element that appears mysterious to me. This element is the apparent distinction between tests of statistical hypotheses, on the one hand, and tests of significance, on the other. If this is not a lapse of someone’s pen, then I hope to learn the conceptual distinction. Continue reading →