No-Pain Philosophy

No-Pain Philosophy (part 3): A more contemporary perspective

See (Part 2)

See (Part 1)

 

7.  How the story turns out (not well)

This conception of testing, which Lakatos called “sophisticated methodological falsificationism,” takes us quite a distance from the more familiar if hackneyed conception of Popper as a simple falsificationist.[i]  It called for warranting a host of different methodological rules for each of the steps along the way in order to either falsify or corroborate hypotheses.  But it doesn’t end well.  Continue reading

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No-Pain Philosophy: Skepticism, Rationality, Popper and All That (part 2): Duhem’s problem & methodological falsification

(See Part 1)

5. Duhemian Problems of Falsification

Any interesting case of hypothesis falsification, or even a severe attempt to falsify, rests on both empirical and inductive hypotheses or claims. Consider the most simplistic form of deductive falsification (an instance of the valid form of modus tollens): “If H entails O, and not-O, then not-H.”  (To infer “not-H” is to infer H is false, or, more often, it involves inferring there is some discrepancy in what H claims regarding the phenomenon in question). Continue reading

Categories: No-Pain Philosophy, philosophy of science | Tags: , , , , | 4 Comments

No-Pain Philosophy: Skepticism, Rationality, Popper, and All That: First of 3 Parts

I want to shift to the arena of testing the adequacy of statistical models and misspecification testing (leading up to articles by Aris Spanos, Andrew Gelman, and David Hendry). But first, a couple of informal, philosophical mini-posts, if only to clarify terms we will need (each has a mini test at the end). Continue reading
Categories: No-Pain Philosophy, philosophy of science | Tags: , , , | 2 Comments

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