See (Part 2)
See (Part 1)
7. How the story turns out (not well)
This conception of testing, which Lakatos called “sophisticated methodological falsificationism,” takes us quite a distance from the more familiar if hackneyed conception of Popper as a simple falsificationist.[i] It called for warranting a host of different methodological rules for each of the steps along the way in order to either falsify or corroborate hypotheses. But it doesn’t end well. Continue reading
(See Part 1)
5. Duhemian Problems of Falsification
Any interesting case of hypothesis falsification, or even a severe attempt to falsify, rests on both empirical and inductive hypotheses or claims. Consider the most simplistic form of deductive falsification (an instance of the valid form of modus tollens): “If H entails O, and not-O, then not-H.” (To infer “not-H” is to infer H is false, or, more often, it involves inferring there is some discrepancy in what H claims regarding the phenomenon in question). Continue reading
I want to shift to the arena of testing the adequacy of statistical models and misspecification testing (leading up to articles by Aris Spanos, Andrew Gelman, and David Hendry). But first, a couple of informal, philosophical mini-posts, if only to clarify terms we will need (each has a mini test at the end). Continue reading 
Experts convene to explore new philosophy of statistics field
Error Statistics Philosophy 