Posts Tagged With: risk assessment

Will the Real Junk Science Please Stand Up?

Junk Science (as first coined).* Have you ever noticed in wranglings over evidence-based policy that it’s always one side that’s politicizing the evidence—the side whose policy one doesn’t like? The evidence on the near side, or your side, however, is solid science. Let’s call those who first coined the term “junk science” Group 1. For Group 1, junk science is bad science that is used to defend pro-regulatory stances, whereas sound science would identify errors in reports of potential risk. (Yes, this was the first popular use of “junk science”, to my knowledge.) For the challengers—let’s call them Group 2—junk science is bad science that is used to defend the anti-regulatory stance, whereas sound science would identify potential risks, advocate precautionary stances, and recognize errors where risk is denied.

Both groups agree that politicizing science is very, very bad—but it’s only the other group that does it!

A given print exposé exploring the distortions of fact on one side or the other routinely showers wild praise on their side’s—their science’s and their policy’s—objectivity, their adherence to the facts, just the facts. How impressed might we be with the text or the group that admitted to its own biases? Continue reading

Categories: 4 years ago!, junk science, Objectivity, Statistics | Tags: , , , , | 29 Comments

Will the Real Junk Science Please Stand Up? (critical thinking)

Equivocations about “junk science” came up in today’s “critical thinking” class; if anything, the current situation is worse than 2 years ago when I posted this.

Have you ever noticed in wranglings over evidence-based policy that it’s always one side that’s politicizing the evidence—the side whose policy one doesn’t like? The evidence on the near side, or your side, however, is solid science. Let’s call those who first coined the term “junk science” Group 1. For Group 1, junk science is bad science that is used to defend pro-regulatory stances, whereas sound science would identify errors in reports of potential risk. For the challengers—let’s call them Group 2—junk science is bad science that is used to defend the anti-regulatory stance, whereas sound science would identify potential risks, advocate precautionary stances, and recognize errors where risk is denied. Both groups agree that politicizing science is very, very bad—but it’s only the other group that does it!

A given print exposé exploring the distortions of fact on one side or the other routinely showers wild praise on their side’s—their science’s and their policy’s—objectivity, their adherence to the facts, just the facts. How impressed might we be with the text or the group that admitted to its own biases?

Take, say, global warming, genetically modified crops, electric-power lines, medical diagnostic testing. Group 1 alleges that those who point up the risks (actual or potential) have a vested interest in construing the evidence that exists (and the gaps in the evidence) accordingly, which may bias the relevant science and pressure scientists to be politically correct. Group 2 alleges the reverse, pointing to industry biases in the analysis or reanalysis of data and pressures on scientists doing industry-funded work to go along to get along.

When the battle between the two groups is joined, issues of evidence—what counts as bad/good evidence for a given claim—and issues of regulation and policy—what are “acceptable” standards of risk/benefit—may become so entangled that no one recognizes how much of the disagreement stems from divergent assumptions about how models are produced and used, as well as from contrary stands on the foundations of uncertain knowledge and statistical inference. The core disagreement is mistakenly attributed to divergent policy values, at least for the most part. Continue reading

Categories: critical thinking, junk science, Objectivity | Tags: , , , , | 16 Comments

When Can Risk-Factor Epidemiology Provide Reliable Tests?

A commentator  brings up risk factor epidemiology, and while I’m not sure the following very short commentary* by Aris Spanos and I directly deals with his query, Greenland happens to mention Popper, and it might be of interest: “When Can Risk-Factor Epidemiology Provide Reliable Tests?

Here’s the abstract:

Can we obtain interesting and valuable knowledge from observed associations of the sort described by Greenland and colleagues in their paper on risk factor epidemiology? Greenland argues “yes,” and we agree. However, the really important and difficult questions are when and why. Answering these questions demands a clear understanding of the problems involved when going from observed associations of risk factors to causal hypotheses that account for them. Two main problems are that 1) the observed associations could fail to be genuine; and 2) even if they are genuine, there are many competing causal inferences that can account for them. Although Greenland’s focus is on the latter, both are equally important, and progress here hinges on disentangling the two to a much greater extent than is typically recognized. 

* We were commenting on “The Value of Risk-Factor (“Black-Box”) Epidemiology” by Greenland, Sander; Gago-Dominguez, Manuela; Castelao, Jose Esteban full citation & abstract can be found at the link above.

Categories: Statistics | Tags: , , , | 2 Comments

Objectivity #2: The “Dirty Hands” Argument for Ethics in Evidence

Some argue that generating and interpreting data for purposes of risk assessment invariably introduces ethical (and other value) considerations that might not only go beyond, but might even conflict with, the “accepted canons of objective scientific reporting.”  This thesis, we may call it the thesis of ethics in evidence and inference, some think, shows that an ethical interpretation of evidence may warrant violating canons of scientific objectivity, and even that a scientist must choose between norms of morality and objectivity.

The reasoning is that since the scientists’ hands must invariably get “dirty” with policy and other values, they should opt for interpreting evidence in a way that promotes ethically sound values, or maximizes public benefit (in some sense).

I call this the “dirty hands” argument, alluding to a term used by philosopher Carl Cranor (1994).1

I cannot say how far its proponents would endorse taking the argument.2 However, it seems that if this thesis is accepted, it may be possible to regard as “unethical” the objective reporting of scientific uncertainties in evidence.  This consequence is worrisome: in fact, it would conflict with the generally accepted imperative for an ethical interpretation of scientific evidence.

Nevertheless, the “dirty hands” argument as advanced has apparently plausible premises, one or more of which would need to be denied to avoid the conclusion which otherwise follows deductively. It goes roughly as follows:

  1. Whether observed data are taken as evidence of a risk depends on a methodological decision as to when to reject the null hypothesis of no risk  H0 (and infer the data are evidence of a risk).
  2. Thus interpreting data to feed into policy decisions with potentially serious risks to the public, the scientist is actually engaged in matters of policy (what is generally framed as an issue of evidence and science, is actually an issue of policy values, ethics, and politics).
  3.  The public funds scientific research and the scientist should be responsible for promoting the public good, so scientists should interpret risk evidence so as to maximize public benefit.
  4. Therefore, a responsible (ethical) interpretation of scientific data on risks is one that maximizes public benefit–and one that does not do so is irresponsible or unethical.
  5. Public benefit is maximized by minimizing the chance of failing to find a risk.  This leads to the conclusion in 6:
  6. CONCLUSION: In situations of risk assessment the ethical interpreter of evidence will maximize the chance of inferring there is a risk–even if this means inferring a risk when there is none with high probability (or at least a probability much higher than is normally countenanced)

The argument about ethics in evidence is often put in terms of balancing type 1 and 2 errors.

Type I error:test T finds evidence of an increased risk ( H0 is rejected), when in fact the risk is absent (false positive)

Type II error:
test T does not find evidence of an increased risk ( H0 is accepted), when in fact an increased risk δ is present (false negative).

The traditional balance of type I and type II error probabilities, wherein type I errors are minimized, some argue, is unethical. Rather than minimize type I errors, it might be  claimed, an “ethical” tester should minimize type II errors.

I claim that at least 3 of the premises, while plausible-sounding, are false.  What do you think?
_____________________________________________________

(1) Cranor (to my knowledge) was among the first to articulate the argument in philosophy, in relation to statistical significance tests (it is echoed by more recent philosophers of evidence based policy):

Scientists should adopt more health protective evidentiary standards, even when they are not consistent with the most demanding inferential standards of the field.  That is, scientists may be forced to choose between the evidentiary ideals of their fields and the moral value of protecting the public from exposure to toxins, frequently they cannot realize both (Cranor 1994, pp. 169-70).

Kristin Shrader-Frechette has advanced analogous arguments in numerous risk research contexts.

(2) I should note that Cranor is aware that properly scrutinizing statistical tests can advance matters here.

Cranor, C. (1994), “Public Health Research and Uncertainty”, in K. Shrader-Frechette, Ethics of Sciencetific Research.  Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 169-186.

Shrader-Frechette, K. (1994), Ethics of Scientific Research, Rowman and Littlefield

Categories: Objectivity, Objectivity, Statistics | Tags: , , , , | 17 Comments

Objectivity #1. Will the Real Junk Science Please Stand Up?

Have you ever noticed in wranglings over evidence-based policy that it’s always one side that’s politicizing the evidence—the side whose policy one doesn’t like? The evidence on the near side, or your side, however, is solid science. Let’s call those who first coined the term “junk science” Group 1. For Group 1, junk science is bad science that is used to defend pro-regulatory stances, whereas sound science would identify errors in reports of potential risk. For the challengers—let’s call them Group 2—junk science is bad science that is used to defend the anti-regulatory stance, whereas sound science would identify potential risks, advocate precautionary stances, and recognize errors where risk is denied.

Both groups agree that politicizing science is very, very bad—but it’s only the other group that does it!

A given print exposé exploring the distortions of fact on one side or the other routinely showers wild praise on their side’s—their science’s and their policy’s—objectivity, their adherence to the facts, just the facts. How impressed might we be with the text or the group that admitted to its own biases?

Take, say, global warming, genetically modified crops, electric-power lines, medical diagnostic testing. Group 1 alleges that those who point up the risks (actual or potential) have a vested interest in construing the evidence that exists (and the gaps in the evidence) accordingly, which may bias the relevant science and pressure scientists to be politically correct. Group 2 alleges the reverse, pointing to industry biases in the analysis or reanalysis of data and pressures on scientists doing industry-funded work to go along to get along.

When the battle between the two groups is joined, issues of evidence—what counts as bad/good evidence for a given claim—and issues of regulation and policy—what are “acceptable” standards of risk/benefit—may become so entangled that no one recognizes how much of the disagreement stems from divergent assumptions about how models are produced and used, as well as from contrary stands on the foundations of uncertain knowledge and statistical inference. The core disagreement is mistakenly attributed to divergent policy values, at least for the most part.

Over the years I have tried my hand in sorting out these debates (e.g., Mayo and Hollander 1991). My account of testing actually came into being to systematize reasoning from statistically insignificant results in evidence based risk policy: no evidence of risk is not evidence of no risk! (see October 5). Unlike the disputants who get the most attention, I have argued that the current polarization cries out for critical or meta-scientific scrutiny of the uncertainties, assumptions, and risks of error that are part and parcel of the gathering and interpreting of evidence on both sides. Unhappily, the disputants tend not to welcome this position—and are even hostile to it.  This used to shock me when I was starting out—why would those who were trying to promote greater risk accountability not want to avail themselves of ways to hold the agencies and companies responsible when they bury risks in fallacious interpretations of statistically insignificant results?  By now, I am used to it.

This isn’t to say that there’s no honest self-scrutiny going on, but only that all sides are so used to anticipating conspiracies of bias that my position is likely viewed as yet another politically motivated ruse. So what we are left with is scientific evidence having less and less a role in constraining or adjudicating disputes. Even to suggest an evidential adjudication risks being attacked as a paid insider.

I agree with David Michaels (2008, 61) that “the battle for the integrity of science is rooted in issues of methodology,” but winning the battle would demand something that both sides are increasingly unwilling to grant. It comes as no surprise that some of the best scientists stay as far away as possible from such controversial science.

Mayo,D. and Hollander. R. (eds.). 1991. Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, Oxford.

Mayo. 1991. Sociological versus Metascientific Views of Risk Assessment, in D. Mayo and R. Hollander (eds.), Acceptable Evidence: 249-79.

Michaels, D. 2008. Doubt Is Their Product, Oxford.

Categories: Objectivity, Statistics | Tags: , , , , | 3 Comments

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