Bayes’ Theorem

You can only become coherent by ‘converting’ non-Bayesianly

Mayo looks at Bayesian foundations

“What ever happened to Bayesian foundations?” was one of the final topics of our seminar (Mayo/SpanosPhil6334). In the past 15 years or so, not only have (some? most?) Bayesians come to accept violations of the Likelihood Principle, they have also tended to disown Dutch Book arguments, and the very idea of inductive inference as updating beliefs by Bayesian conditionalization has evanescencd. In one of Thursday’s readings, by Baccus, Kyburg, and Thalos (1990)[1], it is argued that under certain conditions, it is never a rational course of action to change belief by Bayesian conditionalization. Here’s a short snippet for your Saturday night reading (the full paper is https://errorstatistics.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/bacchus_kyburg_thalos-against-conditionalization.pdf): Continue reading

Categories: Bayes' Theorem, Phil 6334 class material, Statistics | Tags: , | 29 Comments

Phil 6334: Day #3: Feb 6, 2014

img_1249-e1356389909748

Day #3: Spanos lecture notes 2, and reading/resources from Feb 6 seminar 

6334 Day 3 slides: Spanos-lecture-2

___

Crupi & Tentori (2010). Irrelevant Conjunction: Statement and Solution of a New Paradox, Phil Sci, 77, 1–13.

Hawthorne & Fitelson (2004). Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence, Phil Sci 71: 505–514.

Skryms (1975) Choice and Chance 2nd ed. Chapter V and Carnap (pp. 206-211), Dickerson Pub. Co.

Mayo posts on the tacking paradox: Oct. 25, 2013: “Bayesian Confirmation Philosophy and the Tacking Paradox (iv)*” &  Oct 25.

An update on this issue will appear shortly in a separate blogpost.

_

READING FOR NEXT WEEK
Selection (pp. 35-59) from: Popper (1962). Conjectures and RefutationsThe Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Basic Books. 

Categories: Bayes' Theorem, Phil 6334 class material, Statistics | Leave a comment

Blog at WordPress.com.