Slides (2 sets) from Phil 6334 2/27/14 class (Day#6).
D. Mayo:
“Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference”
A. Spanos
“Probability/Statistics Lecture Notes 4: Hypothesis Testing”
Slides (2 sets) from Phil 6334 2/27/14 class (Day#6).
D. Mayo:
“Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference”
A. Spanos
“Probability/Statistics Lecture Notes 4: Hypothesis Testing”
(A) “It is not uncommon to see statistics texts argue that in frequentist theory one is faced with the following dilemma: either to deny the appropriateness of conditioning on the precision of the tool chosen by the toss of a coin[i], or else to embrace the strong likelihood principle which entails that frequentist sampling distributions are irrelevant to inference once the data are obtained. This is a false dilemma … The ‘dilemma’ argument is therefore an illusion”. (Cox and Mayo 2010, p. 298)
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