A reader calls my attention to Andrew Gelman’s blog announcing a talk that he’s giving today in French: “Philosophie et practique de la statistique bayésienne”. He blogs:
I’ll try to update the slides a bit since a few years ago, to add some thoughts I’ve had recently about problems with noninformative priors, even in simple settings.
The location of the talk will not be convenient for most of you, but anyone who comes to the trouble of showing up will have the opportunity to laugh at my accent.
P.S. For those of you who are interested in the topic but can’t make it to the talk, I recommend these two papers on my non-inductive Bayesian philosophy:
[2013] Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics (with discussion). British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 8–18. (Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi) [2013] Rejoinder to discussion. (Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi)
These papers, especially Gelman (2011), are discussed on this blog (in “U-Phils”). Comments by Senn, Wasserman, and Hennig may be found here, and here,with a response here (please use search for more).
As I say in my comments on Gelman and Shalizi, I think Gelman’s position is (or intends to be) inductive– in the sense of being ampliative (going beyond the data)– but simply not probabilist, i.e., not a matter of updating priors. (A blog post is here)[i]. Here’s a snippet from my comments: Continue reading
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