Posts Tagged With: Senn

Comment on the Barnard and Copas (2002) Empirical Example: Aris Spanos

I am grateful to A. Spanos for letting me post a link to his comments on a paper S. Senn shared last week. You can find a pdf of his comments here.

You can read the original Bernard and Copas (2002) article here

Categories: Statistics | Tags: , , , ,

U-PHIL: Stephen Senn (2): Andrew Gelman

 I agree with Senn’s comments on the impossibility of the de Finetti subjective Bayesian approach.  As I wrote in 2008, if you could really construct a subjective prior you believe in, why not just look at the data and write down your subjective posterior.  The immense practical difficulties with any serious system of inference render it absurd to think that it would be possible to just write down a probability distribution to represent uncertainty.  I wish, however, that Senn would recognize “my” Bayesian approach (which is also that of John Carlin, Hal Stern, Don Rubin, and, I believe, others).  De Finetti is no longer around, but we are!
Categories: Philosophy of Statistics, Statistics, U-Phil | Tags: , , , ,

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