Posts Tagged With: references

Error Statistics (brief overview)

In view of some questions about “behavioristic” vs “evidential” construals of frequentist statistics (from the last post), and how the error statistical philosophy tries to improve on Birnbaum’s attempt at providing the latter, I’m reblogging a portion of a post from Nov. 5, 2011 when I also happened to be in London. (The beginning just records a goofy mishap with a skeletal key, and so I leave it out in this reblog.) Two papers with much more detail are linked at the end.

Error Statistics

(1) There is a “statistical philosophy” and a philosophy of science. (a) An error-statistical philosophy alludes to the methodological principles and foundations associated with frequentist error-statistical methods. (b) An error-statistical philosophy of science, on the other hand, involves using the error-statistical methods, formally or informally, to deal with problems of philosophy of science: to model scientific inference (actual or rational), to scrutinize principles of inference, and to address philosophical problems about evidence and inference (the problem of induction, underdetermination, warranting evidence, theory testing, etc.). Continue reading

Categories: Error Statistics, Philosophy of Statistics, Statistics | Tags: , , | 10 Comments

Skeleton Key and Skeletal Points for (Esteemed) Ghost Guest

Secret Key

Why attend presentations of interesting papers or go to smashing London sites when you can spend better than an hour racing from here to there because the skeleton key to your rented flat won’t turn the lock (after working fine for days)? [3 other neighbors tried, by the way, it wasn’t just me.] And what are the chances of two keys failing, including the porter’s key, and then a third key succeeding–a spare I’d never used but had placed in a hollowed-out volume of Error and Inference, and kept in an office at the London School of Economics?  (Yes, that is what the photo is!  A anonymous e-mailer guessed it right, so they must have spies!)  As I ran back and forth one step ahead of the locksmith, trying to ignore my still-bum knee (I left the knee brace in the flat) and trying not to get run over—not easy, in London, for me—I mulled over the perplexing query from one of my Ghost Guests (who asked for my positive account). Continue reading

Categories: philosophy of science, Statistics | Tags: , , | Leave a comment

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