Posts Tagged With: Cosma Shalizi

Cosma Shalizi gets tenure (at last!) (metastat announcement)

ShaliziNews Flash! Congratulations to Cosma Shalizi who announced yesterday that he’d been granted tenure (Statistics, Carnegie Mellon). Cosma is a leading error statistician, a creative polymath and long-time blogger (at Three-Toad sloth). Shalizi wrote an early book review of EGEK (Mayo 1996)* that people still send me from time to time, in case I hadn’t seen it! You can find it on this blog from 2 years ago (posted by Jean Miller). A discussion of a meeting of the minds between Shalizi and Andrew Gelman is here.

*Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.

Categories: Announcement, Error Statistics, Statistics | Tags:

Further Reflections on Simplicity: Mechanisms

To continue with some philosophical reflections on the papers from the “Ockham’s razor” conference, let me respond to something in Shalizi’s recent comments (http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/weblog/). His emphasis on the interest in understanding processes and mechanisms, as opposed to mere prediction, seems exactly right. But he raises a question that seems to me simply answered (on grounds of evidence):  If “a model didn’t seem to need” a mechanism, it is left out, why?

“It’s this, the leave-out-processes-you-don’t-need, which seems to me the core of the Razor for scientific model-building. This is definitely not the same as parameter-counting, and I think it’s also different from capacity control and even from description-length-measuring (cf.), though I am open to Peter persuading me otherwise. I am not, however, altogether sure how to formalize it, or what would justify it, beyond an aesthetic preference for tidy models. (And who died and left the tidy-minded in charge?) The best hope for such justification, I think, is something like Kevin’s idea that the Razor helps us get to the truth faster, or at least with fewer needless detours. Positing processes and mechanisms which aren’t strictly called for to account for the phenomena is asking for trouble needlessly.”

But it is easy to see that if a model M is adequate for data x regarding an aspect of a phenomenon (i.e., M had passed reasonably severe tests with x) , then a model M’ that added an “unnecessary” mechanism would have passed with very low severity, or, if one prefers, M’ would be very poorly corroborated.  To justify “leaving-out-processes-you-don’t-need” then, the appeal is not to aesthetics or heuristics but to the severity or well-testedness of M and M’.

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Categories: philosophy of science, Statistics | Tags: , , , ,

The Error Statistical Philosophy and The Practice of Bayesian Statistics: Comments on Gelman and Shalizi

Mayo elbowThe following is my commentary on a paper by Gelman and Shalizi, forthcoming (some time in 2013) in the British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology* (submitted February 14, 2012).
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The Error Statistical Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics: Comments on A. Gelman and C. Shalizi: Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics**
Deborah G. Mayo

  1. Introduction

I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on this interesting and provocative paper. I shall begin by citing three points at which the authors happily depart from existing work on statistical foundations.

First, there is the authors’ recognition that methodology is ineluctably bound up with philosophy. If nothing else “strictures derived from philosophy can inhibit research progress” (p. 4). They note, for example, the reluctance of some Bayesians to test their models because of their belief that “Bayesian models were by definition subjective,” or perhaps because checking involves non-Bayesian methods (4, n4).

Second, they recognize that Bayesian methods need a new foundation. Although the subjective Bayesian philosophy, “strongly influenced by Savage (1954), is widespread and influential in the philosophy of science (especially in the form of Bayesian confirmation theory),”and while many practitioners perceive the “rising use of Bayesian methods in applied statistical work,” (2) as supporting this Bayesian philosophy, the authors flatly declare that “most of the standard philosophy of Bayes is wrong” (2 n2). Despite their qualification that “a statistical method can be useful even if its philosophical justification is in error”, their stance will rightly challenge many a Bayesian.

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Categories: Statistics | Tags: , , , ,

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