Link to Seminar Flyer pdf.
PSA 2016 Symposium:
Philosophy of Statistics in the Age of Big Data and Replication Crises
Friday November 4th 9-11:45 am (includes coffee break 10-10:15)
Location: Piedmont 4 (12th Floor) Westin Peachtree Plaza
Key Words: big data, frequentist and Bayesian philosophies, history and philosophy of statistics, meta-research, p-values, replication, significance tests.
Science is undergoing a crisis over reliability and reproducibility. High-powered methods are prone to cherry-picking correlations, significance-seeking, and assorted modes of extraordinary rendition of data. The Big Data revolution may encourage a reliance on statistical methods without sufficient scrutiny of whether they are teaching us about causal processes of interest. Mounting failures of replication in the social and biological sciences have resulted in new institutes for meta-research, replication research, and widespread efforts to restore scientific integrity and transparency. Statistical significance test controversies, long raging in the social sciences, have spread to all fields using statistics. At the same time, foundational debates over frequentist and Bayesian methods have shifted in important ways that are often overlooked in the debates. The problems introduce philosophical and methodological questions about probabilistic tools, and science and pseudoscience—intertwined with technical statistics and the philosophy and history of statistics. Our symposium goal is to address foundational issues around which the current crisis in science revolves. We combine the insights of philosophers, psychologists, and statisticians whose work interrelates philosophy and history of statistics, data analysis and modeling. Continue reading
|Home||Call For Papers||Schedule||Venue||Travel and Accommodations|
Submission Deadline: December 1st, 2016
Authors Notified: February 8th, 2017
We invite papers in formal epistemology, broadly construed. FEW is an interdisciplinary conference, and so we welcome submissions from researchers in philosophy, statistics, economics, computer science, psychology, and mathematics.
Submissions should be prepared for blind review. Contributors ought to upload a full paper of no more than 6000 words and an abstract of up to 300 words to the Easychair website. Please submit your full paper in .pdf format. The deadline for submissions is December 1st, 2016. Authors will be notified on February 1st, 2017.
The final selection of the program will be made with an eye towards diversity. We especially encourage submissions from PhD candidates, early career researchers and members of groups that are underrepresented in philosophy. Continue reading
International Prize in Statistics Awarded to Sir David Cox for
Survival Analysis Model Applied in Medicine, Science, and Engineering
EMBARGOED until October 19, 2016, at 9 p.m. ET
ALEXANDRIA, VA (October 18, 2016) – Prominent British statistician Sir David Cox has been named the inaugural recipient of the International Prize in Statistics. Like the acclaimed Fields Medal, Abel Prize, Turing Award and Nobel Prize, the International Prize in Statistics is considered the highest honor in its field. It will be bestowed every other year to an individual or team for major achievements using statistics to advance science, technology and human welfare.
Cox is a giant in the field of statistics, but the International Prize in Statistics Foundation is recognizing him specifically for his 1972 paper in which he developed the proportional hazards model that today bears his name. The Cox Model is widely used in the analysis of survival data and enables researchers to more easily identify the risks of specific factors for mortality or other survival outcomes among groups of patients with disparate characteristics. From disease risk assessment and treatment evaluation to product liability, school dropout, reincarceration and AIDS surveillance systems, the Cox Model has been applied essentially in all fields of science, as well as in engineering. Continue reading
Departament de Filosofia & Centre d’Història de la Ciència (CEHIC), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
Location: CEHIC, Mòdul de Recerca C, Seminari L3-05, c/ de Can Magrans s/n, Campus de la UAB, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona)
Organized by Thomas Sturm & Agustí Nieto-Galan
Current science is full of uncertainties and risks that weaken the authority of experts. Moreover, sometimes scientists themselves act in ways that weaken their standing: they manipulate data, exaggerate research results, do not give credit where it is due, violate the norms for the acquisition of academic titles, or are unduly influenced by commercial and political interests. Such actions, of which there are numerous examples in past and present times, are widely conceived of as violating standards of good scientific practice. At the same time, while codes of scientific conduct have been developed in different fields, institutions, and countries, there is no universally agreed canon of them, nor is it clear that there should be one. The workshop aims to bring together historians and philosophers of science in order to discuss questions such as the following: What exactly is scientific misconduct? Under which circumstances are researchers more or less liable to misconduct? How far do cases of misconduct undermine scientific authority? How have standards or mechanisms to avoid misconduct, and to regain scientific authority, been developed? How should they be developed?
All welcome – but since space is limited, please register in advance. Write to: Thomas.Sturm@uab.cat
09:30 Welcome (Thomas Sturm & Agustí Nieto-Galan) Continue reading
I’m giving a joint presentation with Caitlin Parker on Friday (June 17) at the meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP): “Using Philosophy of Statistics to Make Progress in the Replication Crisis in Psychology” (Rowan University, Glassboro, N.J.) The Society grew out of a felt need to break out of the sterile straightjacket wherein philosophy of science occurs divorced from practice. The topic of the relevance of PhilSci and PhilStat to Sci has often come up on this blog, so people might be interested in the SPSP mission statement below our abstract.
Deborah Mayo Virginia Tech, Department of Philosophy United States
Caitlin Parker Virginia Tech, Department of Philosophy United States
I’m giving a Popper talk at the London School of Economics next Tuesday (10 May). If you’re in the neighborhood, I hope you’ll stop by.
A somewhat accurate blurb is here. I say “somewhat” because it doesn’t mention that I’ll talk a bit about the replication crisis in psychology, and the issues that crop up (or ought to) in connecting statistical results and the causal claim of interest.
Who should apply:
For additional information or to apply online, visit thinkandcode.vtlibraries.org, or contact Dr. Benjamin Jantzen at firstname.lastname@example.org
This will be a mixture of my current take on the “statistics wars” together with my reflections on the recent ASA document on P-values. I was invited over a year ago already by Niels Waller, a co-author of Paul Meehl. I’ll never forget when I was there in 1997: Paul Meehl was in the audience, waving my book in the air–EGEK (1996)–and smiling!
Mike Jacovides: Associate Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University
Palindrome: Emo, notable Stacy began a memory by Rome. Manage by cats, Elba to Nome.
The requirement: A palindrome using “memory” or “memories” (and Elba, of course).
Book choice (out of 12 or more): Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (D. Mayo 1996, Chicago)
Bio: Mike Jacovides is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University. He’s just finishing a book whose title is constantly changing, but which may end up being called Locke’s Image of the World and the Scientific Revolution.
Statement: My interest in palindromes was sparked by my desire to learn more about the philosophy of statistics. The fact that you can learn about the philosophy of statistics by writing a palindrome seems like evidence that anything can cause anything, but maybe once I read the book, I’ll learn that it isn’t. I am glad that ‘emo, notable Stacy’ worked out, I have to say.
Congratulations Mike! I hope you’ll continue to pursue philosophy of statistics! We need much more of that. Good choice of book prize too. D. Mayo Continue reading
David Mellor, from the Center for Open Science, emailed me asking if I’d announce his Preregistration Challenge on my blog, and I’m glad to do so. You win $1,000 if your properly preregistered paper is published. The recent replication effort in psychology showed, despite the common refrain – “it’s too easy to get low P-values” – that in preregistered replication attempts it’s actually very difficult to get small P-values. (I call this the “paradox of replication”.) Here’s our e-mail exchange from this morning:
Dear Deborah Mayod,
I’m reaching out to individuals who I think may be interested in our recently launched competition, the Preregistration Challenge (https://cos.io/prereg). Based on your blogging, I thought it could be of interest to you and to your readers.
In case you are unfamiliar with it, preregistration specifies in advance the precise study protocols and analytical decisions before data collection, in order to separate the hypothesis-generating exploratory work from the hypothesis testing confirmatory work.
Though required by law in clinical trials, it is virtually unknown within the basic sciences. We are trying to encourage this new behavior by offering 1,000 researchers $1000 prizes for publishing the results of their preregistered work.
Please let me know if this is something you would consider blogging about or sharing in other ways. I am happy to discuss further.
David Mellor, PhD
Project Manager, Preregistration Challenge, Center for Open Science
David: Yes I’m familiar with it, and I hope that it encourages people to avoid data-dependent determinations that bias results. It shows the importance of statistical accounts that can pick up on such biasing selection effects. On the other hand, coupling prereg with some of the flexible inference accounts now in use won’t really help. Moreover, there may, in some fields, be a tendency to research a non-novel, fairly trivial result.
And if they’re going to preregister, why not go blind as well? Will they?
Mayo Continue reading
The Royal Statistical Society sent me a letter announcing their latest Journal webinar next Wednesday 21 October:
…RSS Journal webinar on 21st October featuring Bradley Efron, Andrew Gelman and Peter Diggle. They will be in discussion about Bradley Efron’s recently published paper titled ‘Frequentist accuracy of Bayesian estimates’. The paper was published in June in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology), Vol 77 (3), 617-646. It is free to access from October 7th to November 4th.
Webinar start time: 8 am in California (PDT); 11 am in New York (EDT); 4pm (UK time).
During the webinar, Bradley Efron will present his paper for about 30 minutes followed by a Q&A session with the audience. Andrew Gelman is joining us as discussant and the event will be chaired by our President, Peter Diggle. Participation in the Q&A session by anyone who dials in is warmly welcomed and actively encouraged.Participants can ask the author a question over the phone or simply issue a message using the web based teleconference system. Questions can be emailed in advance and further information can be requested from email@example.com.
We’d be delighted if you were able to join us on the 21st and very grateful if you could let your colleagues and students know about the event.
I will definitely be tuning in!
Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP): 41st Annual meeting
SPP 2015 Program
Wednesday, June 3rd
1:30-6:30: Preconference Workshop on Replication in the Sciences, organized by Edouard Machery
1:30-2:15: Edouard Machery (Pitt)
2:15-3:15: Andrew Gelman (Columbia, Statistics, via video link)
3:15-4:15: Deborah Mayo (Virginia Tech, Philosophy)
4:30-5:30: Uri Simonshon (Penn, Psychology)
5:30-6:30: Tal Yarkoni (University of Texas, Neuroscience)
The Philosophy of Statistics: Bayesianism, Frequentism and the Nature of Inference, 2015 APS Annual Convention Saturday, May 23 2:00 PM- 3:50 PM in Wilder (Marriott Marquis 1535 B’way)
Professor of Statistics & Political Science
Luxembourg Institute of Health
Richard Morey, Session Chair & Discussant
Kent Staley has written a clear and engaging introduction to PhilSci that manages to blend the central key topics of philosophy of science with current philosophy of statistics. Quite possibly, Staley explains Error Statistics more clearly in many ways than I do in his 10 page section, 9.4. CONGRATULATIONS STALEY*
You can get this book for free by merely writing one of the simpler palindrome’s in the December contest.
Here’s an excerpt from that section:
9.4 Error-statistical philosophy of science and severe testing
Deborah Mayo has developed an alternative approach to the interpretation of frequentist statistical inference (Mayo 1996). But the idea at the heart of Mayo’s approach is one that can be stated without invoking probability at all. ….
Mayo takes the following “minimal scientific principle for evidence” to be uncontroversial:
Principle 3 (Minimal principle for evidence) Data xo provide poor evidence for H if they result from a method or procedure that has little or no ability of finding flaws in H, even if H is false.(Mayo and Spanos, 2009, 3) Continue reading
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS AND BIOSTATISTICS www.stat.rutgers.edu
Seminar Speaker: Professor Deborah Mayo, Virginia Tech
Title: Probing with Severity: Beyond Bayesian Probabilism and Frequentist Performance
Time: 3:20 – 4:20pm, Wednesday, December 3, 2014 Place: 552 Hill Center
Probing with Severity: Beyond Bayesian Probabilism and Frequentist Performance Getting beyond today’s most pressing controversies revolving around statistical methods, I argue, requires scrutinizing their underlying statistical philosophies.Two main philosophies about the roles of probability in statistical inference are probabilism and performance (in the long-run). The first assumes that we need a method of assigning probabilities to hypotheses; the second assumes that the main function of statistical method is to control long-run performance. I offer a third goal: controlling and evaluating the probativeness of methods. An inductive inference, in this conception, takes the form of inferring hypotheses to the extent that they have been well or severely tested. A report of poorly tested claims must also be part of an adequate inference. I develop a statistical philosophy in which error probabilities of methods may be used to evaluate and control the stringency or severity of tests. I then show how the “severe testing” philosophy clarifies and avoids familiar criticisms and abuses of significance tests and cognate methods (e.g., confidence intervals). Severity may be threatened in three main ways: fallacies of statistical tests, unwarranted links between statistical and substantive claims, and violations of model assumptions.
You still have a few days to respond to the call of your country to solve problems of scientific reproducibility!
The following passages come from Retraction Watch, with my own recommendations at the end.
The White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is taking a look at innovation and scientific research, and issues of reproducibility have made it onto its radar.
Here’s the description of the project from the Federal Register:
The Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Economic Council request public comments to provide input into an upcoming update of the Strategy for American Innovation, which helps to guide the Administration’s efforts to promote lasting economic growth and competitiveness through policies that support transformative American innovation in products, processes, and services and spur new fundamental discoveries that in the long run lead to growing economic prosperity and rising living standards.
I wonder what Steven Pinker would say about some of the above verbiage?
And here’s what’s catching the eye of people interested in scientific reproducibility:
(11) Given recent evidence of the irreproducibility of a surprising number of published scientific findings, how can the Federal Government leverage its role as a significant funder of scientific research to most effectively address the problem?
The OSTP is the same office that, in 2013, took what Nature called “a long-awaited leap forward for open access” when it said “that publications from taxpayer-funded research should be made free to read after a year’s delay.That OSTP memo came after more than 65,000 people “signed a We the People petition asking for expanded public access to the results of taxpayer-funded research.”
Off the top of my head, how about:
Promote the use of methodologies that:
Institute penalties for QRPs and fraud?
Please offer your suggestions in the comments, or directly to Uncle Sam.
[i]It may require a certain courage on the part of researchers, journalists, referees.
Where did you hear this? “Join me, if you will, for a little deep-water drilling, as I cast about on my isle of Elba.” Remember this and this? And this philosophical treatise on “moving blog day”? Oy, did I really write all this stuff?
I still see this as my rag-tag amateur blog. I never learned html and don’t have time to now. But the blog enterprise was more jocund and easy-going then–just an experiment, really, and a place to discuss our RMM papers. (And, of course, a home for error statistical philosophers-in-exile).
A blog table of contents for all three years will appear tomorrow.
Anyway, 2 representatives from Elba flew into NYC and baked this cake in my never-used Chef’s oven (based on the cover/table of contents of EGEK 1996). We’ll be celebrating at A Different Place tonight[i]–so if you’re in the neighborhood, stop by after 8pm for an Elba Grease (on me).
Do you want a free signed copy of EGEK? Say why in 25 words or less (to firstname.lastname@example.org), and the Fund for E.R.R.O.R.* will send them to the top 3 submissions (by 9/10/14).**
Acknowledgments: I want to thank the many commentators for their frequent insights and for keeping things interesting and lively. Among the regulars, and semi-regulars (but with impact) off the top of my head, and in no order: Senn, Yanofsky, Byrd, Gelman, Schachtman, Kepler, McKinney, S. Young, Matloff, O’Rourke, Gandenberger, Wasserman, E. Berk, Spanos, Glymour, Rohde, Greenland, Omaclaren,someone named Mark, assorted guests, original guests, and anons, and mysterious visitors, related twitterers (who would rather tweet from afar). I’m sure I’ve left some people out. Thanks to students and participants in the spring 2014 seminar with Aris Spanos (slides and lecture notes are still up).
I’m especially grateful to my regular guest bloggers: Stephen Senn and Aris Spanos, and to those who were subjected to deconstructions and to U-Phils in years past. (I may return to that some time.) Other guest posters for 2014 will be acknowledged in the year round up.
I thank blog compilers, Jean Miler and Nicole Jinn, and give special thanks for the tireless efforts of Jean Miller who has slogged through html, or whatever it is, when necessary, has scanned and put up dozens of articles to make them easy for readers to access, taken slow ferries back and forth to the island of Elba, and fixed gazillions of glitches on a daily basis. Last, but not least, to the palindromists who have been winning lots of books recently (1 day left for August submissions).
*Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, Objectivity and Rationality.
** Accompany submissions with an e-mail address and regular address. All submissions remain private. Elba judges decisions are final. Void in any places where prohibited by laws, be they laws of likelihood or Napoleanic laws-in-exile. But seriously, we’re giving away 3 books.
[i]email for directions.