Bayes’ Theorem

Mayo looks at Bayesian foundations

“What ever happened to Bayesian foundations?” was one of the final topics of our seminar (Mayo/SpanosPhil6334). In the past 15 years or so, not only have (some? most?) Bayesians come to accept violations of the Likelihood Principle, they have also tended to disown Dutch Book arguments, and the very idea of inductive inference as updating beliefs by Bayesian conditionalization has evanescencd. In one of Thursday’s readings, by Baccus, Kyburg, and Thalos (1990)[1], it is argued that under certain conditions, it is never a rational course of action to change belief by Bayesian conditionalization. Here’s a short snippet for your Saturday night reading (the full paper is https://errorstatistics.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/bacchus_kyburg_thalos-against-conditionalization.pdf): Continue reading →