Posts Tagged With: DO

RMM-8: New Mayo paper: “StatSci and PhilSci: part 2 (Shallow vs Deep Explorations)”

A new article of mine,  “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations” has been published in the on-line journal, Rationality, Markets, and Morals (Special Topic: Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet?”).

The contributions to this special volume began with the conference we ran in June 2010. (See web poster.)   My first article in this collection was essentially just my introduction to the volume, whereas this new one discusses my work. If you are a reader of this blog, you will recognize portions from early posts, as I’d been revising it then.

The sections are listed below. I will be posting portions in the next few days. We invite comments for this blog, and for possible publication in this special volume of RMM, if received before the end of this year.

This is the 8th RMM announcement. Many thanks to Sailor for digging up the previous 7, and listing them at the end*. (The paper’s title stemmed from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of spring 2010**).


Inability to clearly defend against the criticisms of frequentist methods has turned many a frequentist away from venturing into foundational battlegrounds. Conceding the distorted perspectives drawn from overly literal and radical expositions of what Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson ‘really thought’, some deny they matter to current practice. The goal of this paper is not merely to call attention to the howlers that pass as legitimate criticisms of frequentist error statistics, but also to sketch the main lines of an alternative statistical philosophy within which to better articulate the roles and value of frequentist tools.

Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science Part 2:
Shallow versus Deep Explorations

 1. Comedy Hour at the Bayesian Retreat

2. Popperians Are to Frequentists as Carnapians Are to Bayesians
2.1 Severe Tests
2.2 Another Egregious Violation of the Severity Requirement
2.3 The Rationale for Severity is to Find Things Out Reliably
2.4 What Can Be Learned from Popper; What Can Popperians Be Taught?

3. Frequentist Error-Statistical Tests
3.1 Probability in Statistical Models of Experiments
3.2 Statistical Test Ingredients
3.3. Hypotheses and Events
3.4. Hypotheses Inferred Need Not Be Predesignated Continue reading

Categories: Philosophy of Statistics, Statistics | Tags: , | Leave a comment

Deconstructing and Deep-Drilling* 2

Constructing Thebes Library: 2002

Deconstructing: The deconstructionist idea, initially associated with French philosophers like Derrida, and literary theory, denies that a “text” has a single interpretation, intended by the author, but rather that the reader constructs its meaning, unearthing conscious or unconscious significations. While the general philosophy is linked with relativism, postmodernism, and social constructivism—positions to which I am highly allergic—one needn’t embrace them to accord validity to the activity of disinterring meanings: ironies, deceptions, and unintended assumptions and twists in an author’s writing. The passage I cited from Berger seems to offer an example for creative deconstruction of the statistical kind. I wouldn’t have proposed the exercise if I didn’t suspect we might learn something of relevance to our deep-sea drilling activity…. Please continue to send your ponderings….

* DO stock is nearly at a year low! (I surmise a fairly quick trip back up 10 points)

Categories: Irony and Bad Faith, philosophy of science, U-Phil | Tags: , , , | Leave a comment

Blog at