Posts Tagged With: Sir David Cox

U-Phil (Phil 6334) How should “prior information” enter in statistical inference?

On weekends this spring (in connection with Phil 6334, but not limited to seminar participants) I will post relevant “comedy hours”, invites to analyze short papers or blogs (“U-Phils”, as in “U-philosophize”), and some of my “deconstructions” of articles. To begin with a “U-Phil”, consider a note by Andrew Gelman: “Ethics and the statistical use of prior information,”[i].

RMM: "A Conversation Between Sir David Cox & D.G. Mayo"I invite you to send (to error@vt.edu) informal analyses (“U-Phil”, ~500-750 words) by February 10) [iv]. Indicate if you want your remarks considered for possible posting on this blog.

Writing philosophy differs from other types of writing: Some links to earlier U-Phils are here. Also relevant is this note: “So you want to do a philosophical analysis?”

U-Phil (2/10/14): In section 3 Gelman comments on some of David Cox’s remarks in a (highly informal and non-scripted) conversation we recorded:

 A Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation between Sir David Cox and Deborah Mayo,” published in Rationality, Markets and Morals [iii] (Section 2 has some remarks on Larry Wasserman, by the way.)

Here’s the relevant portion of the conversation:

COX: Deborah, in some fields foundations do not seem very important, but we both think foundations of statistical inference are important; why do you think that is?

MAYO: I think because they ask about fundamental questions of evidence, inference, and probability. I don’t think that foundations of different fields are all alike; because in statistics we’re so intimately connected to the scientific interest in learning about the world, we invariably cross into philosophical questions about empirical knowledge and inductive inference.

COX: One aspect of it is that it forces us to say what it is that we really want to know when we analyze a situation statistically. Do we want to put in a lot of information external to the data, or as little as possible. It forces us to think about questions of that sort.

MAYO: But key questions, I think, are not so much a matter of putting in a lot or a little information. …What matters is the kind of information, and how to use it to learn. This gets to the question of how we manage to be so successful in learning about the world, despite knowledge gaps, uncertainties and errors. To me that’s one of the deepest questions and it’s the main one I care about. I don’t think a (deductive) Bayesian computation can adequately answer it.…..

COX: There’s a lot of talk about what used to be called inverse probability and is now called Bayesian theory. That represents at least two extremely different approaches. How do you see the two? Do you see them as part of a single whole? Or as very different? Continue reading

Categories: Background knowledge, Philosophy of Statistics, U-Phil | Tags: , | 2 Comments

U-Phil (9/25/12) How should “prior information” enter in statistical inference?

Andrew Gelman, sent me an interesting note of his, “Ethics and the statistical use of prior information,”[i]. In section 3 he comments on some of David Cox’s remarks in a conversation we recorded:

 A Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation between Sir David Cox and Deborah Mayo,published in Rationality, Markets and Morals [iii] (Section 2 has some remarks on L. Wasserman.)

This was a part of a highly informal, frank, and entirely unscripted conversation, with minimal editing from the tape-recording [ii]. It was first posted on this blog on Oct. 19, 2011. A related, earlier discussion on Gelman’s blog is here.

I want to open this for your informal comments ( “U-Phil”, ~750 words,by September 21 25)[iv]. (send to error@vt.edu)

Before I give my own “deconstruction” of Gelman on the relevant section, I will post a bit of background to the question of background. For starters, here’s the relevant portion of the conversation:

COX: Deborah, in some fields foundations do not seem very important, but we both think foundations of statistical inference are important; why do you think that is?

MAYO: I think because they ask about fundamental questions of evidence, inference, and probability. I don’t think that foundations of different fields are all alike; because in statistics we’re so intimately connected to the scientific interest in learning about the world, we invariably cross into philosophical questions about empirical knowledge and inductive inference.

COX: One aspect of it is that it forces us to say what it is that we really want to know when we analyze a situation statistically. Do we want to put in a lot of information external to the data, or as little as possible. It forces us to think about questions of that sort.

MAYO: But key questions, I think, are not so much a matter of putting in a lot or a little information. …What matters is the kind of information, and how to use it to learn. This gets to the question of how we manage to be so successful in learning about the world, despite knowledge gaps, uncertainties and errors. To me that’s one of the deepest questions and it’s the main one I care about. I don’t think a (deductive) Bayesian computation can adequately answer it. Continue reading

Categories: Background knowledge, Philosophy of Statistics, U-Phil | Tags: , | 2 Comments

RMM-2: "A Conversation Between Sir David Cox & D.G. Mayo"

Published today in Rationality, Markets and Morals

Studies at the Intersection of Philosophy and Economics

 A Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation between Sir David Cox and Deborah Mayo

(as recorded, June, 2011)

Categories: Philosophy of Statistics, Statistics | Tags: , | Leave a comment

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