statistical significance tests

D. Lakens responds to confidence interval crusading journal editors


In what began as a guest commentary on my 2021 editorial in Conservation Biology, Daniël Lakens recently published a response to a recommendation against using null hypothesis significance tests by journal editors from the International Society of Physiotherapy Journal. Here are some excerpts from his full article, replies (‘response to Lakens‘), links and a few comments of my own. Continue reading

Categories: stat wars and their casualties, statistical significance tests | 12 Comments

Join me in reforming the “reformers” of statistical significance tests


The most surprising discovery about today’s statistics wars is that some who set out shingles as “statistical reformers” themselves are guilty of misdefining some of the basic concepts of error statistical tests—notably power. (See my recent post on power howlers.) A major purpose of my Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars (2018, CUP) is to clarify basic notions to get beyond what I call “chestnuts” and “howlers” of tests. The only way that disputing tribes can get beyond the statistics wars is by (at least) understanding correctly the central concepts. But these misunderstandings are more common than ever, so I’m asking readers to help. Why are they more common (than before the “new reformers” of the last decade)? I suspect that at least one reason is the popularity of Bayesian variants on tests: if one is looking to find posterior probabilities of hypotheses, then error statistical ingredients may tend to look as if that’s what they supply.  Continue reading

Categories: power, SIST, statistical significance tests | Tags: , , | 2 Comments

Sir David Cox: Significance tests: rethinking the controversy (September 5, 2018 RSS keynote)

Sir David Cox speaking at the RSS meeting in a session: “Significance Tests: Rethinking the Controversy” on 5 September 2018.

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Categories: Sir David Cox, statistical significance tests | Tags: | Leave a comment

John Park: Poisoned Priors: Will You Drink from This Well?(Guest Post)


John Park, MD
Radiation Oncologist
Kansas City VA Medical Center

Poisoned Priors: Will You Drink from This Well?

As an oncologist, specializing in the field of radiation oncology, “The Statistics Wars and Intellectual Conflicts of Interest”, as Prof. Mayo’s recent editorial is titled, is one of practical importance to me and my patients (Mayo, 2021). Some are flirting with Bayesian statistics to move on from statistical significance testing and the use of P-values. In fact, what many consider the world’s preeminent cancer center, MD Anderson, has a strong Bayesian group that completed 2 early phase Bayesian studies in radiation oncology that have been published in the most prestigious cancer journal —The Journal of Clinical Oncology (Liao et al., 2018 and Lin et al, 2020). This brings about the hotly contested issue of subjective priors and much ado has been written about the ability to overcome this problem. Specifically in medicine, one thinks about Spiegelhalter’s classic 1994 paper mentioning reference, clinical, skeptical, or enthusiastic priors who also uses an example from radiation oncology (Spiegelhalter et al., 1994) to make his case. This is nice and all in theory, but what if there is ample evidence that the subject matter experts have major conflicts of interests (COIs) and biases so that their priors cannot be trusted?  A debate raging in oncology, is whether non-invasive radiation therapy is as good as invasive surgery for early stage lung cancer patients. This is a not a trivial question as postoperative morbidity from surgery can range from 19-50% and 90-day mortality anywhere from 0–5% (Chang et al., 2021). Radiation therapy is highly attractive as there are numerous reports hinting at equal efficacy with far less morbidity. Unfortunately, 4 major clinical trials were unable to accrue patients for this important question. Why could they not enroll patients you ask? Long story short, if a patient is referred to radiation oncology and treated with radiation, the surgeon loses out on the revenue, and vice versa. Dr. David Jones, a surgeon at Memorial Sloan Kettering, notes there was no “equipoise among enrolling investigators and medical specialties… Although the reasons are multiple… I believe the primary reason is financial” (Jones, 2015). I am not skirting responsibility for my field’s biases. Dr. Hanbo Chen, a radiation oncologist, notes in his meta-analysis of multiple publications looking at surgery vs radiation that overall survival was associated with the specialty of the first author who published the article (Chen et al, 2018). Perhaps the pen is mightier than the scalpel! Continue reading

Categories: ASA Task Force on Significance and Replicability, Bayesian priors, PhilStat/Med, statistical significance tests | Tags: | 4 Comments

Should Bayesian Clinical Trialists Wear Error Statistical Hats? (i)


I. A principled disagreement

The other day I was in a practice (zoom) for a panel I’m in on how different approaches and philosophies (Frequentist, Bayesian, machine learning) might explain “why we disagree” when interpreting clinical trial data. The focus is radiation oncology.[1] An important point of disagreement between frequentist (error statisticians) and Bayesians concerns whether and if so, how, to modify inferences in the face of a variety of selection effects, multiple testing, and stopping for interim analysis. Such multiplicities directly alter the capabilities of methods to avoid erroneously interpreting data, so the frequentist error probabilities are altered. By contrast, if an account conditions on the observed data, error probabilities drop out, and we get principles such as the stopping rule principle. My presentation included a quote from Bayarri and J. Berger (2004): Continue reading

Categories: multiple testing, statistical significance tests, strong likelihood principle

Invitation to discuss the ASA Task Force on Statistical Significance and Replication


The latest salvo in the statistics wars comes in the form of the publication of The ASA Task Force on Statistical Significance and Replicability, appointed by past ASA president Karen Kafadar in November/December 2019. (In the ‘before times’!) Its members are:

Linda Young, (Co-Chair), Xuming He, (Co-Chair) Yoav Benjamini, Dick De Veaux, Bradley Efron, Scott Evans, Mark Glickman, Barry Graubard, Xiao-Li Meng, Vijay Nair, Nancy Reid, Stephen Stigler, Stephen Vardeman, Chris Wikle, Tommy Wright, Karen Kafadar, Ex-officio. (Kafadar 2020)

The full report of this Task Force is in the The Annals of Applied Statistics, and on my blogpost. It begins:

In 2019 the President of the American Statistical Association (ASA) established a task force to address concerns that a 2019 editorial in The American Statistician (an ASA journal) might be mistakenly interpreted as official ASA policy. (The 2019 editorial recommended eliminating the use of “p < 0.05” and “statistically significant” in statistical analysis.) This document is the statement of the task force… (Benjamini et al. 2021)

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Categories: 2016 ASA Statement on P-values, ASA Task Force on Significance and Replicability, JSM 2020, National Institute of Statistical Sciences (NISS), statistical significance tests

Why hasn’t the ASA Board revealed the recommendations of its new task force on statistical significance and replicability?

something’s not revealed

A little over a year ago, the board of the American Statistical Association (ASA) appointed a new Task Force on Statistical Significance and Replicability (under then president, Karen Kafadar), to provide it with recommendations. [Its members are here (i).] You might remember my blogpost at the time, “Les Stats C’est Moi”. The Task Force worked quickly, despite the pandemic, giving its recommendations to the ASA Board early, in time for the Joint Statistical Meetings at the end of July 2020. But the ASA hasn’t revealed the Task Force’s recommendations, and I just learned yesterday that it has no plans to do so*. A panel session I was in at the JSM, (P-values and ‘Statistical Significance’: Deconstructing the Arguments), grew out of this episode, and papers from the proceedings are now out. The introduction to my contribution gives you the background to my question, while revealing one of the recommendations (I only know of 2). Continue reading

Categories: 2016 ASA Statement on P-values, JSM 2020, replication crisis, statistical significance tests, straw person fallacy

The Statistics Debate! (NISS DEBATE, October 15, Noon – 2 pm ET)

October 15, Noon – 2 pm ET (Website)

Where do YOU stand?

Given the issues surrounding the misuses and abuse of p-values, do you think p-values should be used? Continue reading

Categories: Announcement, J. Berger, P-values, Philosophy of Statistics, reproducibility, statistical significance tests, Statistics | Tags:

My paper, “P values on Trial” is out in Harvard Data Science Review


My new paper, “P Values on Trial: Selective Reporting of (Best Practice Guides Against) Selective Reporting” is out in Harvard Data Science Review (HDSR). HDSR describes itself as a A Microscopic, Telescopic, and Kaleidoscopic View of Data Science. The editor-in-chief is Xiao-li Meng, a statistician at Harvard. He writes a short blurb on each article in his opening editorial of the issue. Continue reading

Categories: multiple testing, P-values, significance tests, Statistics

On Some Self-Defeating Aspects of the ASA’s (2019) Recommendations on Statistical Significance Tests (ii)


“Before we stood on the edge of the precipice, now we have taken a great step forward”


What’s self-defeating about pursuing statistical reforms in the manner taken by the American Statistical Association (ASA) in 2019? In case you’re not up on the latest in significance testing wars, the 2016 ASA Statement on P-Values and Statistical Significance, ASA I, arguably, was a reasonably consensual statement on the need to avoid some well-known abuses of P-values–notably if you compute P-values, ignoring selective reporting, multiple testing, or stopping when the data look good, the computed P-value will be invalid. (Principle 4, ASA I) But then Ron Wasserstein, executive director of the ASA, and co-editors, decided they weren’t happy with their own 2016 statement because it “stopped just short of recommending that declarations of ‘statistical significance’ be abandoned” altogether. In their new statement–ASA II(note)–they announced: “We take that step here….Statistically significant –don’t say it and don’t use it”.

Why do I say it is a mis-take to have taken the supposed next “great step forward”? Why do I count it as unsuccessful as a piece of statistical science policy? In what ways does it make the situation worse? Let me count the ways. The first is in this post. Others will come in following posts, until I become too disconsolate to continue.[i] Continue reading

Categories: P-values, stat wars and their casualties, statistical significance tests

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