Chance, rational beliefs, decision, uncertainty, probability, error probabilities, truth, random sampling, resampling, opinion, expectations. These are some of the concepts we bandy about by giving various interpretations to mathematical statistics, to statistical theory, and to probabilistic models. But are they real? The question of “ontology” asks about such things, and given the “Ontology and Methodology” conference here at Virginia Tech (May 4, 5), I’d like to get your thoughts (for possible inclusion in a Mayo-Spanos presentation).* Also, please consider attending**.
Interestingly, I noticed the posts that have garnered the most comments have touched on philosophical questions of the nature of entities and processes behind statistical idealizations (e.g.,https://errorstatistics.com/2012/10/18/query/).
1. When an interpretation is supplied for a formal statistical account, its theorems may well turn out to express approximately true claims, and the interpretation may be deemed useful, but this does not mean the concepts give correct descriptions of reality. The interpreted axioms, and inference principles, are chosen to reflect a given philosophy, or set of intended aims: roughly, to use probabilistic ideas (i) to control error probabilities of methods (Neyman-Pearson, Fisher), or (ii) to assign and update degrees of belief, actual or rational (Bayesian). But this does not mean its adherents have to take seriously the realism of all the concepts generated. In fact ,we often (on this blog) see supporters of various stripes of frequentist and Bayesian accounts running far away from taking their accounts literally, even as those interpretations are, or at least were, the basis and motivation for the development of the formal edifice (“we never meant this literally”). But are these caveats on the same order? Or do some threaten the entire edifice of the account?
Starting with the error statistical account, recall Egon Pearson in his “Statistical Concepts in Their Relation to Reality” making it clear to Fisher that the business of controlling erroneous actions in the long run, acceptance sampling in industry and 5-year plans, only arose with Wald, and were never really part of the original Neyman-Pearson tests (declaring that the behaviorist philosophy was Neyman’s, not his). The paper itself may be found here. I was interested to hear (Mayo 2005) Neyman’s arch opponent, Bruno de Finetti, remark (quite correctly) that the expression “inductive behavior…that was for Neyman simply a slogan underlining and explaining the difference between his, the Bayesian and the Fisherian formulations” became with Abraham Wald’s work, “something much more substantial” (de Finetti 1972, 176).
Granted, it has not been obvious to people just how to interpret N-P tests “evidentially “ or “inferentially”—the subject of my work over many years. But there always seemed to me to be enough hints and examples to see what was intended: A statistical hypothesis H assigns probabilities to possible outcomes, and the warrant for accepting H as adequate—for an error statistician– is in terms of how well corroborated H is: how well H has stood up to tests that would have detected flaws in H, at least with very high probability. So the grounds for holding or using H are error statistical. The control and assessment of error probabilities may be used inferentially to determine the capabilities of methods to detect the adequacy/inadequacy of models, and express the extent of the discrepancies that have been identified. We also employ these ideas to detect gambits that make it too easy to find evidence for claims, even if the claims have been subjected to weak tests and biased procedures. A recent post is here.
The account has never professed to supply a unified logic, or any kind of logic for inference. The idea that there was a single rational way to make inferences was ridiculed by Neyman (whose birthday is April 16). Continue reading →
Apple (AAPL) stock is a perfect example of how psychology, fear and superstition enter into stock prices as much as do measures of valuation. Any predictions for this afternoon’s earnings? In general, here’s a field where regardless of what happens, “experts” never have to say they were wrong–especially about Tech. So, certainly we don’t. Thus, a wild guess–AAPL (currently down 300 points over its high) goes up with earnings, but not massively (~5-10pts). Still, there’s such a fear of its being “RIMMED” (i.e., dramatically losing its status as top tech, as did Research in Motion), that it may be beaten down some more.
Error Statistics Philosophy 