Allan Birnbaum: Foundations of Probability and Statistics (27 May 1923 – 1 July 1976)

27 May 1923-1 July 1976

27 May 1923-1 July 1976

Today is Allan Birnbaum’s birthday. In honor of his birthday this year, I’m posting the articles in the Synthese volume that was dedicated to his memory in 1977. The editors describe it as their way of  “paying homage to Professor Birnbaum’s penetrating and stimulating work on the foundations of statistics”. I paste a few snippets from the articles by Giere and Birnbaum. If you’re interested in statistical foundations, and are unfamiliar with Birnbaum, here’s a chance to catch up.(Even if you are,you may be unaware of some of these key papers.)

HAPPY BIRTHDAY ALLAN!

Synthese Volume 36, No. 1 Sept 1977: Foundations of Probability and Statistics, Part I

Editorial Introduction:

This special issue of Synthese on the foundations of probability and statistics is dedicated to the memory of Professor Allan Birnbaum. Professor Birnbaum’s essay ‘The Neyman-Pearson Theory as Decision Theory; and as Inference Theory; with a Criticism of the Lindley-Savage Argument for Bayesian Theory’ was received by the editors of Synthese in October, 1975, and a decision was made to publish a special symposium consisting of this paper together with several invited comments and related papers. The sad news about Professor Birnbaum’s death reached us in the summer of 1976, but the editorial project could nevertheless be completed according to the original plan. By publishing this special issue we wish to pay homage to Professor Birnbaum’s penetrating and stimulating work on the foundations of statistics. We are grateful to Professor Ronald Giere who wrote an introductory essay on Professor Birnbaum’s concept of statistical evidence and who compiled a list of Professor Birnbaum’s publications.

THE EDITORS

Continue reading

Categories: Birnbaum, Error Statistics, Likelihood Principle, Statistics, strong likelihood principle | 7 Comments

Frequentstein: What’s wrong with (1 – β)/α as a measure of evidence against the null? (ii)

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In their “Comment: A Simple Alternative to p-values,” (on the ASA P-value document), Benjamin and Berger (2016) recommend researchers report a pre-data Rejection Ratio:

It is the probability of rejection when the alternative hypothesis is true, divided by the probability of rejection when the null hypothesis is true, i.e., the ratio of the power of the experiment to the Type I error of the experiment. The rejection ratio has a straightforward interpretation as quantifying the strength of evidence about the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis conveyed by the experimental result being statistically significant. (Benjamin and Berger 2016, p. 1)

The recommendation is much more fully fleshed out in a 2016 paper by Bayarri, Benjamin, Berger, and Sellke (BBBS 2016): Rejection Odds and Rejection Ratios: A Proposal for Statistical Practice in Testing Hypotheses. Their recommendation is:

…that researchers should report the ‘pre-experimental rejection ratio’ when presenting their experimental design and researchers should report the ‘post-experimental rejection ratio’ (or Bayes factor) when presenting their experimental results. (BBBS 2016, p. 3)….

The (pre-experimental) ‘rejection ratio’ Rpre , the ratio of statistical power to significance threshold (i.e., the ratio of the probability of rejecting under H1 and H0 respectively), is shown to capture the strength of evidence in the experiment for Hover H0. (ibid., p. 2)

But in fact it does no such thing! [See my post from the FUSION conference here.] J. Berger, and his co-authors, will tell you the rejection ratio (and a variety of other measures created over the years) are entirely frequentist because they are created out of frequentist error statistical measures. But a creation built on frequentist measures doesn’t mean the resulting animal captures frequentist error statistical reasoning. It might be a kind of Frequentstein monster! [1] Continue reading

Categories: J. Berger, power, reforming the reformers, S. Senn, Statistical power, Statistics | 36 Comments

Fallacies of Rejection, Nouvelle Cuisine, and assorted New Monsters

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Jackie Mason

Whenever I’m in London, my criminologist friend Katrin H. and I go in search of stand-up comedy. Since it’s Saturday night (and I’m in London), we’re setting out in search of a good comedy club (I’ll complete this post upon return). A few years ago we heard Jackie Mason do his shtick, a one-man show billed as his swan song to England.  It was like a repertoire of his “Greatest Hits” without a new or updated joke in the mix.  Still, hearing his rants for the nth time was often quite hilarious. It turns out that he has already been back doing another “final shtick tour” in England, but not tonight.

A sample: If you want to eat nothing, eat nouvelle cuisine. Do you know what it means? No food. The smaller the portion the more impressed people are, so long as the food’s got a fancy French name, haute cuisine. An empty plate with sauce!

As one critic wrote, Mason’s jokes “offer a window to a different era,” one whose caricatures and biases one can only hope we’ve moved beyond:

But it’s one thing for Jackie Mason to scowl at a seat in the front row and yell to the shocked audience member in his imagination, “These are jokes! They are just jokes!” and another to reprise statistical howlers, which are not jokes, to me. This blog found its reason for being partly as a place to expose, understand, and avoid them. I had earlier used this Jackie Mason opening to launch into a well-known fallacy of rejection using statistical significance tests. I’m going to go further this time around. I began by needling some leading philosophers of statistics: Continue reading

Categories: reforming the reformers, science-wise screening, Statistical power, statistical tests, Statistics | Tags: , , , , | 5 Comments

Excerpts from S. Senn’s Letter on “Replication, p-values and Evidence”

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I first blogged this letter here. Below the references are some more recent blog links of relevance to this issue. 

 Dear Reader:  I am typing in some excerpts from a letter Stephen Senn shared with me in relation to my April 28, 2012 blogpost.  It is a letter to the editor of Statistics in Medicine  in response to S. Goodman. It contains several important points that get to the issues we’ve been discussing. You can read the full letter here. Sincerely, D. G. Mayo

 STATISTICS IN MEDICINE, LETTER TO THE EDITOR

From: Stephen Senn*

Some years ago, in the pages of this journal, Goodman gave an interesting analysis of ‘replication probabilities’ of p-values. Specifically, he considered the possibility that a given experiment had produced a p-value that indicated ‘significance’ or near significance (he considered the range p=0.10 to 0.001) and then calculated the probability that a study with equal power would produce a significant result at the conventional level of significance of 0.05. He showed, for example, that given an uninformative prior, and (subsequently) a resulting p-value that was exactly 0.05 from the first experiment, the probability of significance in the second experiment was 50 per cent. A more general form of this result is as follows. If the first trial yields p=α then the probability that a second trial will be significant at significance level α (and in the same direction as the first trial) is 0.5. Continue reading

Categories: 4 years ago!, reproducibility, S. Senn, Statistics | Tags: , , , | 3 Comments

My Slides: “The Statistical Replication Crisis: Paradoxes and Scapegoats”

Below are the slides from my Popper talk at the LSE today (up to slide 70): (post any questions in the comments)

 

Categories: P-values, replication research, reproducibility, Statistics | 11 Comments

Some bloglinks for my LSE talk tomorrow: “The Statistical Replication Crisis: Paradoxes and Scapegoats”

Popper talk May 10 locationIn my Popper talk tomorrow today (in London), I will discuss topics in philosophy of statistics in relation to:  the 2016 ASA document on P-values, and recent replication research in psychology. For readers interested in links from this blog, see:

I. My commentary on the ASA document on P-values (with links to the ASA document):

Don’t Throw Out the Error Control Baby with the Bad Statistics Bathwater”

A Small P-value Indicates that the Results are Due to Chance Alone: Fallacious or not: More on the ASA P-value Doc”

“P-Value Madness: A Puzzle About the Latest Test Ban, or ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’”

II. Posts on replication research in psychology: Continue reading

Categories: Metablog, P-values, replication research, reproducibility, Statistics | 7 Comments

My Popper Talk at LSE: The Statistical Replication Crisis: Paradoxes and Scapegoats

I’m giving a Popper talk at the London School of Economics next Tuesday (10 May). If you’re in the neighborhood, I hope you’ll stop by.

Popper talk May 10 location

A somewhat accurate blurb is here. I say “somewhat” because it doesn’t mention that I’ll talk a bit about the replication crisis in psychology, and the issues that crop up (or ought to) in connecting statistical results and the causal claim of interest.

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Categories: Announcement | 6 Comments

Philosophy & Physical Computing Graduate Workshop at VT

A Graduate Summer Workshop at Virginia Tech (Poster)

Application deadline: May 8, 2016 

 

Think & Code VT

PHILOSOPHY & PHYSICAL COMPUTING
JULY 11-24, 2016 at Virginia Tech

Who should apply:

  • This workshop is open to graduate students in master’s or PhD programs in philosophy or the sciences, including computer science.

For additional information or to apply online, visit thinkandcode.vtlibraries.org, or contact Dr. Benjamin Jantzen at bjantzen@vt.edu

Categories: Announcement | Leave a comment

Yes, these were not (entirely) real–my five April pranks

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My “April 1” posts for the past 5 years have been so close to the truth or possible truth that they weren’t always spotted as April Fool’s pranks, which is what made them genuine April Fool’s pranks. (After a few days I labeled them as such, or revealed it in a comment). So since it’s Saturday night on the last night of April, I’m reblogging my 5 posts from first days of April. (Which fooled you the most?) Continue reading

Categories: Comedy, Statistics | 1 Comment

3 YEARS AGO (MARCH & APRIL 2013): MEMORY LANE

3 years ago...

3 years ago…

MONTHLY MEMORY LANE: 3 years ago–March & April 2013. I missed March memory lane, so both are combined here. I mark in red three posts most apt for a general background on key issues in this blog [1]. I’ve added some remarks in blue this month, for some of the posts that are not marked in red.

March 2013

  • (3/1) capitalizing on chance-Worth a look (has a pic of Mayo gambling)!
  • (3/4) Big Data or Pig Data?–Funny & clever(guest post)!
  • (3/7) Stephen Senn: Casting Stones
  • (3/10) Blog Contents 2013 (Jan & Feb)
  • (3/11) S. Stanley Young: Scientific Integrity and Transparency
  • (3/13) Risk-Based Security: Knives and Axes-Funny, strange!
  • (3/15) Normal Deviate: Double Misunderstandings About p-values–worth keeping in mind.
  • (3/17) Update on Higgs data analysis: statistical flukes (1)
  • (3/21) Telling the public why the Higgs particle matters
  • (3/23) Is NASA suspending public education and outreach?
  • (3/27) Higgs analysis and statistical flukes (part 2)
  • (3/31) possible progress on the comedy hour circuit?–One of my favorites, a bit of progress

Continue reading

Categories: 3-year memory lane, Statistics | Leave a comment

Jerzy Neyman and “Les Miserables Citations” (statistical theater in honor of his birthday)

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Neyman April 16, 1894 – August 5, 1981

In honor of Jerzy Neyman’s birthday today, a local acting group is putting on a short theater production based on a screenplay I wrote:  “Les Miserables Citations” (“Those Miserable Quotes”) [1]. The “miserable” citations are those everyone loves to cite, from their early joint 1933 paper:

We are inclined to think that as far as a particular hypothesis is concerned, no test based upon the theory of probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of that hypothesis.

But we may look at the purpose of tests from another viewpoint. Without hoping to know whether each separate hypothesis is true or false, we may search for rules to govern our behavior with regard to them, in following which we insure that, in the long run of experience, we shall not be too often wrong. (Neyman and Pearson 1933, pp. 290-1).

Continue reading

Categories: E.S. Pearson, Neyman, Statistics | 7 Comments

When the rejection ratio (1 – β)/α turns evidence on its head, for those practicing in an error-statistical tribe (ii)

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I’m about to hear Jim Berger give a keynote talk this afternoon at a FUSION conference I’m attending. The conference goal is to link Bayesian, frequentist and fiducial approaches: BFF.  (Program is here. See the blurb below [0]).  April 12 update below*. Berger always has novel and intriguing approaches to testing, so I was especially curious about the new measure.  It’s based on a 2016 paper by Bayarri, Benjamin, Berger, and Sellke (BBBS 2016): Rejection Odds and Rejection Ratios: A Proposal for Statistical Practice in Testing Hypotheses. They recommend:

that researchers should report what we call the ‘pre-experimental rejection ratio’ when presenting their experimental design and researchers should report what we call the ‘post-experimental rejection ratio’ (or Bayes factor) when presenting their experimental results.” (BBBS 2016)….

“The (pre-experimental) ‘rejection ratio’ Rpre , the ratio of statistical power to significance threshold (i.e., the ratio of the probability of rejecting under H1 and H0 respectively), is shown to capture the strength of evidence in the experiment for H1 over H0 .”

If you’re seeking a comparative probabilist measure, the ratio of power/size can look like a likelihood ratio in favor of the alternative. To a practicing member of an error statistical tribe, however, whether along the lines of N, P, or F (Neyman, Pearson or Fisher), things can look topsy turvy. Continue reading

Categories: confidence intervals and tests, power, Statistics | 31 Comments

Winner of March 2016 Palindrome: Manan Shah

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Manan Shah

Manan Shah channels Jack Nicholson in “The Shining” to win this month’s palindrome contest (and the book of his choice).* 

Winner of March 2016 Contest: Manan Shah

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Palindrome: I was able to. I did add well. Liking is, I say, as evil as dad’s aloof. Delivery reviled sign: “I red rum”. Examine men I’m axe murdering. Is delivery reviled? Fool! As dad’s alive, say as I sign: “I kill lewd dad.” Idiot Elba saw I.

The requirements: In addition to using Elba, a candidate for a winning palindrome must have used examine (or examined or examination)

Bio: Manan Shah is a mathematician and owner of Think. Plan. Do. LLC  (www.ThinkPlanDoLLC.com). He writes at www.mathmisery.com and is looking to publish his first book, hopefully by the end of this year. He holds a PhD in Mathematics from Florida State University.
Continue reading

Categories: Palindrome, Rejected Posts | Leave a comment

I’m speaking at Univ of Minnesota on Friday

I’ll be speaking at U of Minnesota tomorrow. I’m glad to see a group with interest in philosophical foundations of statistics as well as the foundations of experiment and measurement in psychology. I will post my slides afterwards. Come by if you’re in the neighborhood. 

University of Minnesota
“The ASA (2016) Statement on P-values and
How to Stop Refighting the Statistics Wars”


April 8, 2016 at 3:35 p.m.

 

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Deborah G. Mayo
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech

The CLA Quantitative Methods
Collaboration Committee
&
Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science

275 Nicholson Hall
216 Pillsbury Drive SE
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis MN

 

This will be a mixture of my current take on the “statistics wars” together with my reflections on the recent ASA document on P-values. I was invited over a year ago already by Niels Waller, a co-author of Paul Meehl. I’ll never forget when I was there in 1997: Paul Meehl was in the audience, waving my book in the air–EGEK (1996)–and smiling!

Categories: Announcement | 3 Comments

Er, about those “other statistical approaches”: Hold off until a balanced critique is in?

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I could have told them that the degree of accordance enabling the “6 principles” on p-values was unlikely to be replicated when it came to most of the “other approaches” with which some would supplement or replace significance tests– notably Bayesian updating, Bayes factors, or likelihood ratios (confidence intervals are dual to hypotheses tests). [My commentary is here.] So now they may be advising a “hold off” or “go slow” approach until some consilience is achieved. Is that it? I don’t know. I was tweeted an article about the background chatter taking place behind the scenes; I wasn’t one of people interviewed for this. Here are some excerpts, I may add more later after it has had time to sink in. (check back later)

“Reaching for Best Practices in Statistics: Proceed with Caution Until a Balanced Critique Is In”

J. Hossiason

“[A]ll of the other approaches*, as well as most statistical tools, may suffer from many of the same problems as the p-values do. What level of likelihood ratio in favor of the research hypothesis will be acceptable to the journal? Should scientific discoveries be based on whether posterior odds pass a specific threshold (P3)? Does either measure the size of an effect (P5)?…How can we decide about the sample size needed for a clinical trial—however analyzed—if we do not set a specific bright-line decision rule? 95% confidence intervals or credence intervals…offer no protection against selection when only those that do not cover 0, are selected into the abstract (P4). (Benjamini, ASA commentary, pp. 3-4)

What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander right?  Many statisticians seconded George Cobb who urged “the board to set aside time at least once every year to consider the potential value of similar statements” to the recent ASA p-value report. Disappointingly, a preliminary survey of leaders in statistics, many from the original p-value group, aired striking disagreements on best and worst practices with respect to these other approaches. The Executive Board is contemplating a variety of recommendations, minimally, Continue reading

Categories: Bayesian/frequentist, Statistics | 84 Comments

A. Spanos: Talking back to the critics using error statistics

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Given all the recent attention given to kvetching about significance tests, it’s an apt time to reblog Aris Spanos’ overview of the error statistician talking back to the critics [1]. A related paper for your Saturday night reading is Mayo and Spanos (2011).[2] It mixes the error statistical philosophy of science with its philosophy of statistics, introduces severity, and responds to 13 criticisms and howlers.

I’m going to comment on some of the ASA discussion contributions I hadn’t discussed earlier. Please share your thoughts in relation to any of this.

[1]It was first blogged here, as part of our seminar 2 years ago.

[2] For those seeking a bit more balance to the main menu offered in the ASA Statistical Significance Reference list.

 

See also on this blog:

A. Spanos, “Recurring controversies about p-values and confidence intervals revisited

A. Spanos, “Lecture on frequentist hypothesis testing

 

 

Categories: Error Statistics, frequentist/Bayesian, reforming the reformers, statistical tests, Statistics | 72 Comments

All She Wrote (so far): Error Statistics Philosophy: 4.5 years on

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D.G. Mayo with her  blogging typewriter

Error Statistics Philosophy: Blog Contents (4.5 years)
By: D. G. Mayo [i]

Dear Reader: It’s hard to believe I’ve been blogging for 4 and a half  years (since Sept. 3, 2011)! A big celebration is taking place at the Elbar Room as I type this. Please peruse the offerings below, and take advantage of some of the super contributions and discussions by guest posters and readers! I don’t know how much longer I’ll continue blogging, but at least until the publication of my my book, “How to Tell What’s True About Statistical Inference.” After that I plan to run conferences, workshops, and ashrams on PhilStat and PhilSci, and will invite readers to take part! Keep reading and commenting. Sincerely, D. Mayo

September 2011

Continue reading

Categories: blog contents, Metablog, Statistics | Leave a comment

Your chance to continue the “due to chance” discussion in roomier quarters

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Comments get unwieldy after 100, so here’s a chance to continue the “due to chance” discussion in some roomier quarters. (There seems to be at least two distinct lanes being travelled.) Now one of the main reasons I run this blog is to discover potential clues to solving or making progress on thorny philosophical problems I’ve been wrangling with for a long time. I think I extracted some illuminating gems from the discussion here, but I don’t have time to write them up, and won’t for a bit, so I’ve parked a list of comments wherein the golden extracts lie (I think) over at my Rejected Posts blog[1]. (They’re all my comments, but as influenced by readers, so I thank you!) Over there, there’s no “return and resubmit”, but around a dozen posts have eventually made it over here, tidied up. Please continue the discussion on this blog (I don’t even recommend going over there). You can link to your earlier comments by clicking on the date.

[1] The Spiegelhalter (PVP)  link is here.

Categories: Error Statistics, P-values, Rejected Posts, Statistics | 36 Comments

“A small p-value indicates it’s improbable that the results are due to chance alone” –fallacious or not? (more on the ASA p-value doc)

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There’s something about “Principle 2” in the ASA document on p-values that I couldn’t address in my brief commentary, but is worth examining more closely.

2. P-values do not measure (a) the probability that the studied hypothesis is true , or (b) the probability that the data were produced  by random chance alone,

(a) is true, but what about (b)? That’s what I’m going to focus on, because I think it is often misunderstood. It was discussed earlier on this blog in relation to the Higgs experiments and deconstructing “the probability the results are ‘statistical flukes'”. So let’s examine: Continue reading

Categories: P-values, statistical tests, Statistics | 170 Comments

Don’t throw out the error control baby with the bad statistics bathwater

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My invited comments on the ASA Document on P-values*

The American Statistical Association is to be credited with opening up a discussion into p-values; now an examination of the foundations of other key statistical concepts is needed.

Statistical significance tests are a small part of a rich set of “techniques for systematically appraising and bounding the probabilities (under respective hypotheses) of seriously misleading interpretations of data” (Birnbaum 1970, p. 1033). These may be called error statistical methods (or sampling theory). The error statistical methodology supplies what Birnbaum called the “one rock in a shifting scene” (ibid.) in statistical thinking and practice. Misinterpretations and abuses of tests, warned against by the very founders of the tools, shouldn’t be the basis for supplanting them with methods unable or less able to assess, control, and alert us to erroneous interpretations of data. Continue reading

Categories: Error Statistics, P-values, science communication, Statistics | 19 Comments

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